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RECENT CASES
Antitrust -Monopolies -Merger of Firm with a Potential
Competitor that May Enter the Market by Toe-Hold Acquisition
Violates Section 7 of Clayton Act
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a complaint
requesting divestiture of the merger of Bendix Corporation, a diversified
manufacturer of components and assemblies for the automotive and
aerospace industries,' with Fram Corporation, the third leading
producer in the highly concentrated market of replacement filters for
automobiles. 2 The FTC contended that the merger violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act 3 by substantially lessening competition in the
automotive filter aftermarket, 4 since it was possible for Bendix to enter
the market by toe-hold acquisition-an acquisition of a small company
capable of expansion into a substantial competitive force. The hearing
examiner dismissed the FTC complaint after finding that Bendix
Corporation would not have entered the automotive filter aftermarket
by internal expansion, 5 and therefore, was not a potential competitor
with Fram.6 On appeal to the FTC, held, reversed. A merger that
substantially lessens competition by removing from the market's
1. Bendix participated in a minor capacity in the filter industry. In 1966, Bendix's automotive
filter sales allowed it to control 0.35% of the market, which was equal to or greater than one-third of
the firms in that market. Bendix's filter division was losing money, however, and Bendix began to
explore the possibility of an acquisition to remedy its losses. Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(1970 Trade Cas.) 19,288, at 21,444 (FTC June 18, 1970).
2. Approximately 55% of Fram's 1966 sales were automotive filters. Fram was the third-
ranking producer with 12.4% of the market. In the passenger car filter aftermarket Fram ranked
third in sales with 17.2% of the market. Id. at 21,442.
3. "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
4. Three types of automotive filters--oil, air, and fuel-are used on all kinds of engines, from
light truck and passenger car engines to heavy truck and off-highway equipment engines. There are
2 general markets for these filters: (1) sales to the original equipment manufacturers for installation
in the new engine and (2) sales to firms for replacing worn-out filters (the aftermarket). Sales in the
aftermarket require complex marketing and advertising techniques.
5. Bendix's filter division mainly produced heavy duty oil and fuel filters for original
equipment makers. Only a small proportion of the sales of the filter division were made in the
lucrative aftermarket. See note 2 supra.
6. The FTC hearing examiner adhered to the traditional guidelines established by the
Supreme Court and the FTC in previous cases. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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periphery a potential competitor that may enter the market by toe-hold
acquisition violates section 7 of the Clayton Act. Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE
REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 19,288 (FTC June 18, 1970).
The Clayton Act was enacted to provide a more efficacious means
of curbing the proliferation of anti-competitive mergers 7 when it
appeared that the Sherman Acts had failed to arrest this trend. Section 7
of the Clayton Act prohibits both stock and asset acquisition, of one
commercial corporation by another that would result in a substantial
abatement of competition in a particular market. Although primarily
created to prevent entry of a firm into a market by merger of leading
firms,10 section 7 was challenged in its incipience for also precluding
entry by toe-hold acquisition of a minor firm by a leading firm." A
justifiably uneasy Congress was assured by section 7 proponents that a
combination of two small companies or a powerful firm with a small one
was not proscribed, but was in fact encouraged, 2 since it resulted in
stronger competition within the particular market. The Supreme Court,
nevertheless, narrowed the questioned statutory test of whether a merger
substantially lessens competition in any field of commerce 3 and focused
its attention on whether the merger substantially lessens competition by
removing the possibility that the merging firm would have entered the
market through internal expansion. 14 Although no court has ordered
7. Section 7 of the Clayton Act was enacted to close some of the many gaps left by the
Sherman Act. 95 CONG. Rac. 11484 (1949) (remarks of Representative Celler).
8. The Sherman Act was originally enacted to curb the rapid growth of monopolistic
businesses. The provisions were too limited, however, to be potent. H.R. RaP. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 6-7 (1949).
9. The most common form of merger at the time of the Clayton Act's inception was by stock
acquisition. After the Clayton Act proscribed anti-competitive stock acquisition mergers, however,
most mergers began to take the form of asset acquisitions. Therefore, in 1950 Congress
amended § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950), to
include asset acquisitions as well as stock acquisitions. 96 CONG. Rc. 16433 (1950) (remarks of
Senator O'CQnor).
10. 96 CONG. REc. 16433 (1950) (remarks of Senator O'Conor).
11. The legislative history of the Clayton Act discloses that many officials were concerned
that a strict interpretation of § 7 would prevent any corporation from acquiring the stock of any
competitor. The exponents of the legislation affirmed, however, that the purpose of the Clayton Act
was not to prevent the merger of 2 small corporations, but 2 large and wealthy corporations. Id.
12. The authors of § 7 arrested the fears of a sizeable faction in Congress by asserting that
the provision would not be strictly interpreted by the judiciary, since the legislature had evinced a
policy to promote pro-competitive mergers by toe-hold acquisition. Bendix Corp., 3 TADE REG.
REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 19,288, at 21,450-52 (FTC June 18, 1970); 96 CONG. Rac. 16433, 16436
(1950) (remarks of Senator O'Conor).
13. The broadness of the § 7 test, asking whether the effect of a merger "may be
substantially to lessen competition in any field of commerce," was the factor of much alarm in
Congress. See note I 1 supra.
14. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). The Court held that the
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divestiture predicated upon the possibility of entry by toe-hold
acquisition, 15 the Supreme Court laid the basis for such a holding in
three 1964 decisions. 6 These cases outlined the principle that potential
competition, in whatever form, must be maintained as a regulator of
economic behavior.1 7 The Court, however, found the possibility of entry
by internal expansion dispositive of all three cases.IS The Supreme Court,
joined by the lower federal courts and the FTC, has rigidly adhered to
the more narrow guideline in decisions since 1964.19
In disposing of the hearing examiner's determination that Bendix
was not a potential entrant into the automotive filter aftermarket, the
FTC evinced that the examiner's analysis had focused exclusively on the
probability of Bendix's entry by internal expansion while neglecting
other means of entry.3" Recognizing that previous Supreme Court cases
had only considered internal expansion as one possible means of entry,21
the Commission reasoned that the Court's determinations more
appropriately concentrated on anti-competitive consequences rather
than on the form of entry. The Commission then turned to an analysis
of the economic consequences of the instant merger and noted three
salient features of the automobile filter aftermarket that made it
particularly amenable to application of the toe-hold acquisition test: (1)
proper test for determining the tendency of a merger to substantially lessen competition in violation
of the Clayton Act is whether there is reasonable probability that the acquiring corporation would
have entered the field of the merged corporation by internal expansion, but for the merger. See
EKCO Prod. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
15. The Supreme Court has never confronted the issue. The FTC's instant opinion takes
cognizance of the fact that it is introducing a new test. Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1970
Trade Cas.) 19,288, at 21,445 (FTC June 18, 1970).
16. In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), the Court stated that
the words, "may be substantially to lessen competition," in § 7 manifest the congressional
concern with probabilities of anti-competitiveness and not with certainties on one extreme or
tenuous possibilities on the other. Accord, United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441
(1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
17. In United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441,461 (1964), the Court ruled that
where an industry is already highly concentrated, it is important to prevent even slight increases
therein, consistent with the purported aims of the Clayton Act.
18. In all 3 cases the entering firm already had a small industrial capacity in the market,
which could have been extended by the internal growth of that firm.
19. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 38 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
20. Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. RaP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 19,288, at 21,445 (FTC June 18,
1970).
21. Id.
22. The Commissioner stated that it would serve the purpose of the Clayton Act if the
influence of a potential competitior were exerted either through a possibility of internal expansion or
toe-hold acquisition. Id.
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the pro-competitive effects of the imposing figure of Bendix at the
market's edge; (2) the noticeable weakness of existing market
competition; and (3) the substantial barriers to entry that made Bendix's
presence on the fringe even more valuable. 23 The FTC ordered
divestiture, concluding that the possibility of entry by toe-hold
acquisition should be equivalent to the probability of internal expansion
as a test for qualifying a firm as a potential competitor. 4
The instant case, by introducing the possibility of entry into a
market by toe-hold acquisition as a factor in determining whether a
firm is a potential competitor, imposes an additional check on mergers
being challenged under section 7 of the Clayton Act. A merger that
might otherwise survive because the merging firm was not a likely
entrant by internal expansion can now be proscribed by the probability
of entry by toe-hold acquisition.21 An approximation of the number of
mergers that will be interdicted annually by this new limitation would be
too speculative to have significance. Theoretically, any market that
contains minor firms would be a susceptible target of the toe-hold
acquisition test.26 Moreover, any extra-market firm with the financial
capacity and industrial propensity toward entrance could be categorized
as a potential competitor capable of entry by toe-hold acquisition.27 The
courts may not, however, resort to the alternative restraint recognized by
the instant decision because the possibility of internal expansion is often
determinative of the case.?' Nonetheless, the extensive scope of the entry-
by-acquisition test gives the courts substantial discretionary latitude in
defining an anti-competitive merger. An unfortunate complication may
arise as a result of the courts being compelled to distinguish each
23. Id. at 21,450-53.
24. Id. at 21,445. The Commissioner stated that all likely routes for potential entry must be
evaluated in determining the legality of the merger route that was actually chosen. In response to
Bendix's election of the wrong route, the Commission ordered a complete divestiture of Fram from
Bendix and required Bendix to obtain FTC approval of all acquisitions in the automotive filter
aftermarket for the next 10 years.
25. The actual number of firms lounging on the periphery of a given market having some type
of industrial capacity, which may be expanded internally to accomplish entry, must be finite.
However, the number of firms somewhere in the marginal area that possess the financial potential
for entry may be limited only to the number of firms operating at a substantial profit in closely
related markets. Certainly the latter number is greater.
26. Logically, if a market has minor firms, then a merger of one of those firms and an outside
firm would be defined as a toe-hold acquisition. See Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade
Cas.) 19,228, at 21,444 (FTC June 18, 1970).
27. See note 25 supra.
28. The courts have found the doctrine of internal expansion flexible enough to encompass
almost all situations that were flagrantly anti-competitive. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); EKCO Prod. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
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combination of firms as either a toe-hold acquisition or a prohibited
merger of leading firms, since each merger must be categorized as one or
the other before the anti-competitiveness can be determined. The logical
extension of the reasoning in the instant case would prompt the courts to
consider any merger that combines the entering firm with one that is
higher on the production scale than at least one other firm as less
desirable than a union of the entering firm and the lowest intra-market
firm. If, as the decision suggests, a toe-hold acquisition is seldom anti-
competitive, then a toe-hold acquisition of the lowest firm in the market
by the entering firm would be the least anti-competitive merger. The
union would be proportionately more anti-competitive as one moves up
the production scale and thus more vulnerable to proscription by section
7. Consequently, the only merger with certain immunity would be the
union of the entering firm and the firm least capable of becoming a
substantial competitor in the market. Realizing the dangerous breadth
of the toe-hold acquisition test the courts may narrow its scope so that it
applies only to factual situations such as the instant one-where the
market was particularly sensitive to the presence of a potential
competitor on its periphery and was significantly injured by the removal
of that competitor. 2' If the entry-by-acquisition test were adopted
wholly, in its undiluted form, 30 the judiciary would possess a latent power
to control big business that section 7 of the Clayton Act did not purport
to bestow.31 It would be a regrettable commentary on judicial wisdom if
the entry-by-acquisition test should reach the anomalous proportions
described.
29. The Commission recognized 3 factors that rendered the automobile filter aftermarket
especially sensitive to the presence of Bendix as a potential competitor. It may be difficult for the
Court to find another market with the same degree of sensitivity. Thus, the instant holding could
conceivably be limited by its inherently narrow factual circumstances. See note 25 supra.
30. The actual toe-hold acquisition test itself as delineated in the instant case was not
modified, limited, or qualified in any manner. That the only merger with immunity from the
reasoning of the instant decision would be the union of the entering firm and the lowest firm in the
market would be a rationally anticipated result, unless the courts decide to limit the test to the
factual situation in the instant case. See notes 25 & 29 supra and accompanying text.
31. The legislative history of § 7 reveals that the merger of minor firms was not intended to
be proscribed. Indeed, it was stated conversely at several discussions. 96 CONG. REC. 16436 (1950);
95 CONG. Rac. 11488 (1949); H.R. RP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1949).
19701
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Antitrust -Private Antitrust Actions Against Air
Polluters-Commercial Relationship Between Litigants Not
Necessary to Maintain an Action for Violation of Section 1 of
Sherman Act
Plaintiffs, alleging that defendant automobile manufacturers
conspired to delay the development and installation of pollution control
devices for motor vehicles, brought class actions' seeking treble
damages 2 for violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 The plaintiffs
claimed injury to their respective "business or property by reason of" 4
the alleged conspiracy.5 Defendants claimed that the class actions could
not be maintained, 6.and that even if class actions were proper, plaintiffs
failed to allege that direct injuries were caused by specific overt acts
pursuant to the alleged conspiracy. The defendants further contended
that the complaints should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted because there was no "commercial
1. The actions are grouped in Appendix A to the opinion according to the respective classes
represented. These include: (1) "all persons in the United States" (4 complaints); (2) "all farmers of
the United States" (one complaint); (3) "all people within the State of - and its political
subdivisions" (5 complaints); (4) "political subdivisions, public corporations and authorities within
New York" (one complaint); (5) "residents" (3 complaints); and (6) "all persons who own
property, real or personal, or who conduct a business within the State of California damaged as the
result of air pollution caused by automobiles" (one complaint). In re Multidistrict Private Civil
Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation Involving Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 5
TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,317, at 89,254 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1970).
2. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964): "Any person who shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue. . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States. . . is declared
to be illegal."
4. The instant suits grew out of the antitrust conspiracy suit filed by the Justice Department
against the Automobile Manufacturers Association and General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and
American Motors. The government action resulted in a consent decree that barred the defendant
corporations from conspiring to delay the use of antipollution devices but did not state that they
were guilty of conspiring in the past. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 1969 Trade Cas.
87,456 (C.D. Cal.). Plaintiffs in the instant cases failed in their attempts to intervene in the earlier
suit. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,070
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 1969).
5. The alleged injuries varied according to class. For example, the governments claimed that
they had been injured by damage to public buildings and greenery, increased benefits to welfare
clients suffering from pollution-related diseases, and increased expenditures to combat air pollution.
The suit on behalf of all farmers in the United States claimed crop damage resulting from air
pollution.
6. Defendants contended that common questions of law and fact that predominated over
questions individual to class members were absent and that the alleged classes were unmanageable.
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relationship" between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The United
States District Court for the Central District of California, held,
defendants' motion to dismiss denied and cases ordered to be tried by a
jury. Claims of injury to business or property by reason of a conspiracy
by automobile manufacturers to delay the installation of pollution
control devices on motor vehicles are actionable, despite the absence of a
commercial relationship between the litigants. In re Multidistrict Private
Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation Involving Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Equipment, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.)
73,317 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1970).
The private antitrust suit, despite its attractive tender of treble
damages, was rarely utilized in its first 50 years of availability. 7 These
suits have been discouraged because plaintiffs have had difficulty in
pleading and proving three distinct elements of the cause of action., The
first requirement in a private suit is proof of a "legal injury" and not
just a violation of the statute. 9 The private plaintiff, moreover, has not
been permitted to use evidentiary findings in a prior government-
instituted suit to prove his injury when the previous suit resulted in a
consent decree.' 0 The strictness of the requirement for proof of injury,
however, has been alleviated in recent cases that have allowed plaintiffs
to maintain actions on the mere allegation that they have been injured by
the statutory violation." This liberal treatment has resulted from
recognition of the inherent difficulty of properly setting forth in the
pleadings all details and specific facts.' 2 The second element that
plaintiffs traditionally have had to plead and prove is a statutory
violation as the proximate cause of the alleged injury. The courts
frequently have determined the violation's causal effect on the plaintiff's
7. As of 1940, there were a mere 175 antitrust cases reported, with judgment for the plaintiff
in only 13 of these. Note, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in
the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952).
8. See Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust
Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 691, 692 (1963).
9. See, e.g., Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 830 (1949).
10. The proviso to § 5 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964), expressly excepts
"consent judgments or decrees" from the prima facie evidentiary advantage usually derived from
government antitrust suits. See Note, Antitrust Consent Decrees: A Proposal to Enlist Private
Plaintiffs in Enforcement Efforts, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 763, 771-72 (1969).
11. E.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961)
(allegations adequate to show a violation causing injury to plaintiff are all that the law requires in
order to state a claim in a private treble damage action); cf. Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy
Cooperative Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968) (in an antitrust action, doubts should be resolved in
favor of the position that will uphold the pleading).
12. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445,453-54 (1957).
1970]
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injury as a matter of law and have denied a jury trial on this issue unless
a significant causal connection has been shown. 3 The Supreme Court
attempted to ease this restriction in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc.4 by finding that a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial if he can show
some causal relation between his losses and the defendant's violation of
the antitrust laws. Although courts now generally permit private
plaintiffs to reach juries when any reasonable inference of causal relation
is possible, 15 some post-Bigelow decisions have indicated that the courts
may still find an insufficient relation between the violation and the injury,
and subsequently dismiss the plaintiffs complaint on the basis of the
pleadings.' The final element in private antitrust actions has been the
requirement, expressly stated in some cases, that a "commercial
relationship" exist between the litigants. 7 Since the antitrust laws were
designed "to promote competition and prevent its restraint,"' 8 actions
under these laws have been restricted to cases involving commercial
losses, as distinguished from personal damage suffered by remote
parties. Consequently, the statutory phrase "business or property"" has
been construed by the courts to denote a commercial business or
market.20 A plaintiff presumably has no cause of action, therefore, if he
is not within the "target area" of the conspiracy-that sector of the
economy that has been directly injured by the antitrust violation. 2' These
stringent requirements of injury, proximate cause, and commercial
relationship were followed in a recent case decided by the Second
Circuit. In Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,2 the court endorsed the
13. See, e.g., Abouafv. Spreckels Co., 26 P. S'upp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
14. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
15. E.g., Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1948); Louisiana
Farmers' Protective Union v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 131 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1942).
16. E.g., A.J. Goodman & Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D.
Mass. 1949).
17. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 919 (1952) (affirming defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings where none of the
acts alleged effectuated a restraint on commercial competition in the movie industry).
18. Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440, 443
(E.D. Pa. 1960), affd, 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
20. See, e.g., Peller v. International Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593, 595-96 (7th Cir. 1955). This
point is discussed further in Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in
Treble Damage Actions Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 30 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 231 (1961).
21. See, e.g., Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956) (patent licensor denied standing to sue for treble damages for
royalties lost because of injury to its licensee).
22. 39 U.S.L.W. 2137 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 1970) (Waterman, J., dissenting). Plaintiff-
franchiser claimed that competitors had used allegedly improper methods to persuade retail outlets
to buy products other than those manufactured and sold by franchised bottlers paying royalties to
[Vol. 24
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need for a plaintiff to show that his commercial injury was a direct,
rather than an incidental, result of the defendant's illegal act in order for
him to possess the requisite standing to sue for treble damages. These
requirements demonstrate precisely why the private antitrust action has
never been used in the past to combat pollution. There are suits pending,
however, such as the one filed by two Chicago aldermen against all
leading automobile, truck, and tractor manufacturers for conspiring to
delay installation of air pollution control devices on their vehicles,2 3 that
reflect a willingness by plaintiffs to employ an old remedy in a yet
untried manner.
The instant court found that the maintenance of class actions was
proper with respect to common issues of law and fact in approximately
one-half of the cases pending 4 but adhered to the principle that a
plaintiff representative must be a member of the class purportedly
represented. The court, therefore, decided that a governmental entity z2
could not maintain a class action on behalf of individual residents.2
Turning its attention to the injury alleged by the plaintiffs, the court
noted that it would not evaluate the complaint by strict interpretation of
the traditional elements of the private antitrust suit but would utilize a
more liberal approach because of the relation between antitrust laws and
possible new sources of injury, such as air pollution. The court,
therefore, expanded the meaning of the statutory phrase "injured by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"27 to allow the
plaintiffs to maintain the cause of action. Concluding that the plaintiffs
plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore contended that he was entitled to sue for treble damages for franchise
royalties diverted by plaintiff's acts. Plaintiff's suit was dismissed for lack of standing to sue under
§ 4 of the Clayton Act.
23. Kean v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 69c- 1900 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 16, 1969).
24. "Although there may be some differences in the effect of smog on various crops or the
fauna and flora of a state, political subdivision, public corporation or public authority, the
pleadings as they now stand do allege a class properly represented in Morgan [in which an individual
farmer represents all farmers in the United States] and in Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Connecticut, Wisconsin, New York and California with respect to common issues of law and fact
which predominate over questions affecting only individual members." 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970
Trade Cas.) 73,317, at 89,253.
25. The cases alleging representation by a governmental entity involved the complaints of
Illinois, New Mexico, California, Wisconsin, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Philadelphia,
and Lackawana. Id.
26. The court concluded that in the context of the alleged acts by defendants and any damage
resulting therefrom, a governmental agency raises issues that are peculiar only to its status as a
governmental agency. The representation of governmental entities as a class, however, was
approved. The court also stated that it would depend on the ingenuity of counsel to solve the
problems in managing the classes until such management was recognized as impossible. Id. at
89,253-54.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (emphasis added).
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should be permitted to benefit from "any available remedy to make
good the wrong done," 2 the court found that the injury alleged would be
assumed for purposes of the motion to dismiss and that the plaintiffs
were entitled to have the issues of conspiracy and injury tried by a jury,
despite the absence of a commercial relationship between the plaintiffs
and the defendants.
The instant case substantially strengthens the private antitrust suit
as a possible effective remedy against polluters by affirming the recent
trend of easing the strict requirements of the three elements of the action.
Under this decision, the first element is satisfied by a mere allegation
that an injury was sustained. With respect to the second element of
proximate cause, the court noted that the Bigelow rule, requiring
submission of causal issues to the jury whenever there is a reasonable
inference that the violation caused the injury, can be easily circumvented
by a finding that the defendant's act was only an indirect factor in the
chain of causation. 2' The instant case, however, allowed the plaintiffs to
reach a jury by only showing some causal connection between their
injury and the defendant's violation. The overwhelmingly significant
contribution of the instant decision is its treatment of the third element
of the private antitrust action. The court rendered the requirement of a
strictly "commercial relationship" between litigants as unnecessary to
sustain a cause of action and thus effectively broadened the class of
possible plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were allowed to utilize an efficacious
legal remedy for pollution damage even though the remedy had not
previously been tried in this context. This expansive decision implements
the legislative policy of providing a private cause of action, as manifested
by section 4 of the Clayton Act,3 0 to supplement governmental
enforcement of antitrust laws.31 Private suits also are encouraged by the
tender of treble damages, which threatens potential antitrust violators
with punitive damages.32 There are policy considerations, however, that
militate against the effectiveness of the private antitrust suit. Since the
public has a definite interest in protecting industry from the claims of
remote plaintiffs, specific proof of a direct causal injury to the private
28. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 1 73,318, at 89,256.
29. See A.J. Goodman & Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass.
1949).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
31. See United States v. Borden, 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954).
32. See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743,751-52 (1947); Bergen
Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725, 728 (3d Cir. 1962). General policy considerations
regarding private antitrust actions are discussed in Note, Proximate Cause as a Limitation on
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 160, 161 (1969).
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plaintiff should be required.3 For this reason, the policy considerations
that encourage private suits are not in themselves a sufficient
justification for the court to lessen the degree of proof required to state a
cause of action.3 The expense of defending numerous antitrust suits and
the fact that two-thirds of the mandatory treble damages is a penalty
should also caution against an unreasonable imposition of liability that
might unjustly reward a remote plaintiff.3 Despite policy reasons for
limiting the private antitrust suits, the instant decision is justified on a
broader base that recognizes the potential use of antitrust law to combat
the automobile industry's failure to develop antipollution devices. The
widespread ramifications that the private antitrust action might have on
other industries makes this decision an attractive tool for plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, it should be observed that the plaintiffs in the instant case
must still prove to a jury that there was in fact a conspiracy that resulted
in a loss to them before they can recover treble damages. Because of the
nature of the various plaintiffs' claims and the extensiveness of the
classes represented, the proof of proximate causation required for
recovery will be difficult in some of the cases. The significance of the
instant case, nevertheless, remains clear. Rather than being bound by the
traditional restrictive approach, the decision liberalizes the statutory
provisions concerning the injury and causation elements of the plaintiff's
complaint in order to determine that a cause of action exists. Since vast
class actions apparently will be allowed when proper representative
plaintiffs are selected, it is probable that similar suits may soon be
utilized to combat industrial polluters on the national and local levels.
The result is a potentially powerful new use for the private antitrust
action as an aid in the fight against pollution.
Communications-Fairness Doctrine Does Not Require Regular
Presentation of Antipollution Announcements
Petitioner, Friends of the Earth Society, filed a complaint with the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) alleging that Station
33. See Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Cal. 1951),
affd, 215 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955). This contention is discussed in
Timberlake, supra note 20, at 240.
34. See Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass.
1956).
35. Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affd, 211 F.2d
405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954) (holding plaintiff's injury too remote to maintain a
cause of action against motion picture producer under the Clayton Act).
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WNBC-TV had failed to comply with the fairness doctrine and meet its
public interest obligations concerning coverage of the issue of air
pollution caused by automobiles and gasoline.' Petitioner contended that
automobile and gasoline commercials, like cigarette commercials,
represent only one side of a controversial issue of public importance.
Station WNBC-TV denied petitioner's allegations and argued that it
had fulfilled its fairness obligation with respect to the issue of air
pollution in its overall performance.2 The FCC, held, complaint denied.
Since automobile and gasoline commercials do not raise a controversial
issue of public importance, broadcasters are not required to provide
regular free time for antipollution spot announcements in order to fulfill
their fairness doctrine obligations. FCC Opinion Letter to Gary Soucie,
No. FCC 70-862 (Aug. 5, 1970).
Comprehensive regulation of broadcasting by the federal
government began with the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927, 3 which
provided for the formation of the Federal Radio Commission to
administer its provisions. From its inception the Commission, now the
Federal Communications Commission, was concerned with the content
of broadcast programming.4 The Communications Act of 1934, 5 which
utilized the Radio Act as its basis, presently embodies most of the
statutory law in the field of broadcast control, and is the basis for
regulation of program content.' Regulation of this kind apparently was
envisioned by Congress,7 and has been sanctioned by the Supreme
Court.8 The 1934 Act broadly instructs the Commission to allocate
1. The petitioner originally wrote WNBC setting forth his objections to the programming in
regard to pollution and seeking free time to present antipollution spot announcements. He
particularly objected to automobile and gasoline commercials. The petitioner asked the FCC to
require WNBC to carry their antipollution announcements free of charge.
2. See generally FCC Opinion Letter to Dodson, No. FCC 70-915 (Aug. 26, 1970),
summarized in 39 U.S.L.W. 2157 (Sept. 22, 1970). The FCC held that a broadcaster could refuse to
carry a union's spot announcement during a strike, even though the station carried the company's
commercial messages. See also FCC Memorandum Opinion and Order, No. FCC 70-861 (Aug. 5,
1970); FCC Opinion Letter to Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, No. FCC 70-860
(Aug. 5, 1970).
3. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, as amended 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964).
4. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BROADCAST LICENSEES 10 (1946); 1928 FRC ANNUAL REP. 155-56.
5. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended 47 U.S.C. §§ 15 1-609 (1964).
6. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). But cf. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964) (forbidding censorship or
interference with the right of free speech by the Commission).
7. See 67 CONG. REC. 5478-79 (1926) (remarks of Representative White).
8. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), the Court stated that
the Communications Act of 1934 "itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not limited
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broadcast frequencies on the basis of the "public convenience, interest,
or necessity."' In 1949, the FCC formulated the fairness doctrine in
order to implement this mandate and to achieve better program
content."9 This doctrine was designed to develop "an informed public
opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas concerning
the vital public issues of the day."" In essence, the fairness doctrine
requires that broadcasters, while presenting controversial issues of
public importance, afford a reasonable opportunity for the presentation
of opposing viewpoints.12 Thus, the threshold decision that must be made
in determining the applicability of the fairness doctrine is whether the
issue in question is a controversial issue of public importance.
3
Normally, this question is resolved by the broadcaster, using
"reasonable judgment in good faith on the facts in each situation."' 4
The FCC has failed to articulate any standard or test that may
be utilized in judging whether an issue is controversial or noncon-
troversial, 5 leaving broadcasters without clear guidance in their
efforts to fulfill their fairness obligations." The Commission has ruled
to the engineering and technical aspects of the regulation of radio communication. . . . [T]he Act
does not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission
the burden of determining the composition of that traffic." Id. at 215-16.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964).
10. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1248-52 (1949); see Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964).
11. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949). "And we have
recognized . . . the paramount right of the public in a free society to be informed and to have
presented to it for acceptance or rejection the different attitudes and viewpoints concerning these
vital and often controversial issues which are held by the various groups which make up the
community." Id.
12. The fairness doctrine has been recognized as a legitimate exercise of the authority
delegated by Congress. In 1959, Congress exempted legally qualified political candidates on certain
news-type programs from the "equal time" requirements of § 315 of the Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964), formerly ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), thus tacitly
recognizing the fairness doctrine. The legislative history of the amendment also supports this view.
See S. REp. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1959).
13. Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: A Broadcaster's Dilemma, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
719, 725 (1964); Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L. REv. 701, 709
(1964); see Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,
13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
14. 29 Fed. Reg. 10416 (1964). - "
15. Commentators have urged that various standards be adopted. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra
note 13, at 726-27 (degree of social significance); Note, supra note 13, at 709 (whether the issue is
one on which some concerted public action might reasonably be brought to bear); 53 IOWA L. REv.
480, 490 (1967) (public opinion).
16. One commentator thinks that the meaning of "controversial issue" is so unclear that no
one really knows what it means. Thus there is a possible fertile ground for governmental intrusion
amounting to censorship. Sullivan, supra note 13, at 768.
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that an issue may be controversial regardless of the form of
presentation,17 the extent of its coverage by other media,1 8 or its
characterization as local or national in nature." The Commission has
further held that a broadcaster should be judged by his overall
performance 20 and that an honest mistake in judgment" or simple
negligence will relieve him from Commission sanctions. There have
been, however, a number of situations in which the Commission has pre-
empted the broadcaster's judgment and has established by decree that
certain issues are controversial because of their peculiar nature. The
FCC, for example, determined that the nuclear test ban treaty,24 CATV
and subscription television,25 debt adjusting practices, 21 and cigarette
advertising z  were controversial issues requiring the application of the
fairness doctrine s It is not clear what factors the Commission considers
important in making its judgments, 2' but the most significant one
17. Petition of Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C. 197 (1946); cf. Report on "Living Should Be Fun"
Inquiry, 33 F.C.C. 101 (1962); Public Notice-B, 40 F.C.C. 571,572 (1963).
18. WSOC Broadcasting Co., 17 P & F RADIO REG. 548 (1968).
19. See Note, supra note 13, at 709.
20. See, e.g., Harry Lerner, 15 F.C.C.2d 75 (1968); Captain James E. Hamilton, 40 F.C.C.
454 (1957).
21. Golden West Broadcasters, 8 F.C.C.2d 987 (1967); Andrew B. Letson, 40 F.C.C.2d 987
(1967).
22. Golden West Broadcasters, 8 F.C.C.2d 987 (1967); see Anti-Defamation League, 4
F.C.C.2d 217 (1966) (isolated violations held insufficient to invoke sanctions).
23. Several possible remedies for violation of the fairness doctrine are open to the
Commission. It has the authority to revoke or suspend licenses, to issue cease-and-desist orders, and
to make rules. The Commission also may impose fines for certain willful violations. See Note, supra
note 13, at 703.
24. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
25. See, e.g., WBRE-TV, Inc., I F.C.C.2d 833 (1965); Pennsylvania Community Antenna
Ass'n, 6 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 112 (1964); WSOC Broadcasting Co., 17 P & F RADIO REG. 548
(1958).
26. Radio Denver, Inc., 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 570 (1965).
27. Television Station, WCBS-TV, 9 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1423 (1967).
28. The FCC also has determined that other issues were controversial. Lamar Life
Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 556 (1963) (civil rights); Tri-State Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 508
(1962) (supposed Communist infiltration and encirclement); Report on "Living Should Be Fun"
Inquiry, 33 F.C.C. 101 (1962) (health products and advice); The Evening News Ass'n, 40 F.C.C.
441 (1950) (labor strike); see Rochester Area Council of Churches, Inc., 7 P & F RADIO REG. 2d
869 (1966) (community action project); cf. American Friends of Vietnam, Inc., 6 P & F RADIO
REG. 2d 126 (1965) (war in Vietnam); Petition of Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C. 197 (1946) (alcohol
advertising). See also FCC Opinion Letter to Dorothy Healey, No. FCC 70-658 (June 24, 1970)
(personal attack doctrine); Madalyn Murray, 40 F.C.C. 647 (1965) (personal attack doctrine).
29. The Commission has occasionally pointed to some factors it deems relevant.
Pennsylvania Community Antenna Ass'n, 6 P & RADIO REG. 2d 112 (1965) (active considera-
tion by local government officials); Report on "Living Should Be Fun" Inquiry, 33 F.C.C. 101
(1962) (health hazard); New Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 439 (1950) (actively being "contro-
verted" by members of Congress or the public); The Evening News Ass'n, 40 F.C.C. 441 (1950)
(common knowledge).
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appears to be the extent of coverage already given to one side of the issue
by the broadcast licensee.Y Once it has been determined that an issue is
controversial, the broadcaster is obligated to afford a fair opportunity
for presentation of opposing viewpoints. Fair opportunity has often been
equated with "significant" amount of time,31 but this standard has not
been adequately defined. Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, the
broadcaster must make a "good faith judgment" to allot time fairly,32
and coverage of opposing viewpoints must be given even if sponsorship is
unavailable.3 Programming also must be sought on the licensee's own
initiative if no other source is available.3 There had been very little
occasion to deal with the application of the fairness doctrine to
advertisings until the recent landmark decision of Television Station
WCBS-TV,36 which was affirmed in Banzhaf v. FCC.3 The decision held
that cigarette commercials 3 represent a controversial issue of public
importance that warrants the application of the fairness doctrine and
requires a "significant" amount of rebuttal time.3' The FCC found that
the frequency of presentation of one side of this controversy necessitated
30. E.g., Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 556 (1963); New Broadcasting Co., 40
F.C.C. 439 (1950). If a significant amount of coverage has already been given the issue, there is a
presumption that the broadcaster has already determined in his best judgment that the issue is
controversial.
31. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
32. Television Station, WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 941 (1967); Cullman Broadcasting Co.,
40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963); Lawrence M.C. Smith, 40 F.C.C. 549, 550 (1963); Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1250 (1949).
33. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 503 (1965); Cullman Broadcasting
Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
34. Governor John J. Dempsey, 40 F.C.C. 445 (1950). See also Metropolitan Broadcasting
Co., 40 F.C.C. 491 (1959).
35. Until the cigarette decision, only one other case had dealt with advertising. In that
decision a complaint was filed that sought to have a broadcaster's license revoked because the
station refused the petitioner time to present temperance viewpoints. The complaint was denied.
Petition of Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C. 197 (1946).
36. 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967).
37. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
38. The holding was expressly limited to cigarettes. The Commission rejected the argument
that the decision could not be limited to only one product, but must extend to many others whose
normal use involves some health hazard. Television Station, WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 943
(1967). One Commissioner, however, argued that this decision could not be limited to cigarettes:
"The Commission will be hard pressed to find a rational basis for holding that cigarettes differ
from all other hazards to life and health. Contrary to the argument in the Commission's opinion,
the normal use of automobiles does pose a health hazard, polluting the atmosphere to a degree that
is dangerous not only to those using the automobiles but, even worse, in some localities to everyone
including infants and invalids." Id. at 954 (Loevinger, concurring).
39. The Commission felt that cigarettes were unique for 2 reasons: (1) the extensive
governmental and private reports that showed the normal use of cigarettes to be detrimental to
health, and (2) the pending congressional action. Id. at 943.
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the presentation of the opposing viewpoints on a "regular basis."4 The
opinion did not specifically require spot advertisements, but the spot
advertisement remained the only practical method of fulfilling the
licensee's obligation.41 In reaching its conclusion, however, the majority
emphasized that it was limiting this application of the fairness doctrine
to cigarette commercials only.
In the instant decision, the FCC found that cigarette advertisements
present a unique situation and are distinguishable from automobile and
gasoline commercials. The majority distinguished cigarettes from other
products on three grounds. First, it found that, unlike automobiles and
gasoline, cigarette smoking is a personal habit and does not involve
ecological problems. Secondly, the Commission observed that although
it is now proposing a total ban on cigarette commercials,4 2 no one would
propose such a ban on "the fruits of the technological revolution. '" 3
Thirdly, the FCC found that if effective action is to be taken to eliminate
pollution, the focus must be on the products themselves, not the
"peripheral aspects of advertising. ' 44 The Commission concluded,
therefore, that automobile and gasoline commercials do not present a
controversial issue of public importance 45 necessary to invoke the
fairness doctrine.46 The majority, however, noted that a broadcaster has
40. "For, while the Fairness Doctrine does not contemplate 'equal time', if the presentation
of one side of the issue is on a regular continual basis, fairness and the right of the public to be
adequately informed compels the conclusion that there must be some regularity in the presentation
of the other side of the issue. This consideration is not limited to advertising." Id. at 941. "The mere
fact that information is available, or even that it is actually heard or read, does not mean that it is
effectively understood. A man who hears a hundred 'yeses' for each 'no' when the actual odds lie
heavily the other way, cannot be realistically deemed adequately informed." Banzhaf v. FCC, 405
F.2d 1082, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
41. "A licensee which has just presented a very lengthy program on this issue obviously might
reach a different judgment as to what his obligation was in respect for the next week or so. But as
stated, the carriage of the normally substantial amount of weekly commercials raises a concomitant
responsibility to be met over relatively the same period of time." Television Station, WCBS-TV, 9
F.C.C.2d 921,942 (1967).
42. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 32 Fed. Reg. 13162 (1967); FCC Opinion Letter to
Gary Soucie, No. FCC 70-862, at 3 (Aug. 5, 1970).
43. The FCC reasoned that outright prohibition of cigarettes may not be effective, as in the
case of the former ban on alcohol. Therefore there is all the more reason to use alternative means,
such as education, to stop the use of cigarettes. This, however, is not true with automobiles. There
could be little effective bootlegging of cars or gasoline; therefore, an outright ban would be effective.
Id. at 5-6.
44. Furthermore, the FCC held that even if automobile commercials did invoke the fairness
doctrine by raising an issue of public importance, fairness would not require regular presentation of
antipollution commercials. Such a result, the Commission argued, would undermine the American
system of broadcasting. Id. at 8-9.
45. The Commission noted that if the pollution issue were raised directly by commercials or
otherwise, the fairness doctrine would apply. Id. at 10.
46. This action is consistent, the Commission felt, with the obligation of the National
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an obligation to inform the public about environmental issues whether
or not he carries commercials. One Commissioner dissented, contending
that the issue is not whether cigarettes and automobiles are similar in all
respects, but whether the advocacy of their use raises an issue of public
importance sufficient to invoke the fairness doctrine. The dissent
concluded that by applying this analysis it becomes clear that the
fairness doctrine is applicable to automobile and gasoline commercials
because it is only by the effective presentation of the competing interests
concerning the use of the automobile that the American public can be
told the whole truth about all aspects of the products they use and
consume.
4 7
In the instant decision the FCC, in refusing to extend the rationale
of the anti-smoking decisions, seems to have misinterpreted the issue
presented by the complaint. The dissent recognized that the relevant
question was not whether cigarettes and automobiles are similar in all
respects, but whether the advocacy of the use of automobiles and
gasoline by commercials raises a sufficiently controversial issue of
public importance to invoke the fairness doctrine.48 The resolution of this
issue should be based on a consideration of several factors. First, many
automobile commercials leave the impression that the use of high-
powered automobiles will result in a glamorous, virile life. These
commercials, however, do not reveal the increased air pollution that
results from the use of high-powered cars. 49 The complaint sought only
to require the broadcaster to present alternative life styles, such as the
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (Mar. Supp. 1970), and the holding of
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
47. The dissenting commissioner, Nicholas Johnson, also argued that the majority's
underlying rationale, that the requirement of spot antipollution announcements will destroy
commercial television, was misplaced. Prior to the antismoking decision, the same argument was
advanced and time has shown that antismoking commercials will not destroy commercial television.
Furthermore, there is no economic information available to warrant such a conclusion. The dissent
also points out that the majority decision would subject the broadcaster to review, under the "public
interest" doctrine, only once every 3 years. Thus, the dissent argues, the unscrupulous broadcaster
would be able to suppress or misrepresent any views, at least until his license expires. FCC Opinion
Letter to Gary Soucie, No. FCC 70-862, dissent at 3-11 (Aug. 5, 1970) (Comm'r Johnson).
48. "Once again, the majority has successfully seized and wrestled to the ground a phantom
of its own creation." FCC Opinion Letter to Gary Soucie, FCC No. 70-862, dissent at 9 (Aug. 5,
1970) (Comm'r Johnson).
49. "The spots in question invoke the familiar Madison Avenue techniques: the enticement of
glamour and excitement, ('Be a Big Rider!'); the allure of travel and faraway places; the invocation
of the ethic of masculinity; pleasant surroundings often out of more usual context (by showing an
automobile on a clean beach); and the reassuring appearance of well-known, pleasant-looking
personalities intoning blandishments prepared by the manipulation specialists." FCC Opinion
Letter to Gary Soucie, FCC No. 70-862, dissent at 8 (Aug. 5, 1970) (Comm'r Johnson).
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use of low-polluting cars, that would result in a decrease in pollution.
Secondly, air pollution caused by automobiles represents a substantial
health hazard for millions of people, and the general concern for the
effective control and eventual elimination of air pollution should need no
documentation.51 Thirdly, the decisions to smoke cigarettes and to
purchase high-powered automobiles are individual decisions. These
choices are directly influenced by advertisements, but neither automobile
nor cigarette commercials mention the detrimental effects caused by the
product's normal use. The health hazard from smoking directly affects
only the smoker, but automobile air pollution affects the entire
community. The justifiable conclusion is that the detrimental effect on
society is greater from automobile air pollution than from cigarette
smoking. Thus it can reasonably be argued that the need for public
education about the viable alternatives to automobile air pollution is
greater than the need to educate the public about the hazards of
smoking. An analysis of these factors leads to the conclusion that
automobile and gasoline commercials present one side of a controversial
issue of public importance and therefore should require the application
of the fairness doctrine. In many situations it is possible for a
broadcaster to satisfy this obligation with normal programming. But
since automobile and gasoline commercials are presented with such
frequency, the FCC should require that broadcasters air opposing
viewpoints on a regular basis in order to fulfill the fair opportunity
requirement. 52 This standard would provide the individual licensee with a
concrete guide with which to discharge his fairness obligations and
assure that the general public would be adequately informed about
opposing viewpoints.53 If the broadcaster fails to comply with an FCC
50. "There are, after all, alternatives to automobiles-new rapid transit systems, subways,
electric automobile engines, bicycle riding, and plain old walking." Id. at 5. See also A. LEAVITr,
SUPERHIGHWAY SUPERHOAX (1970); Washington Post, July 20, 1970, at A22, col. 1.
51. E.g., Cassell, The Health Effects of Air Pollution and Their Implications for Control, 33
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1968); Note, Cigarette Advertising and the Public Health, 6 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 99 (1970); see Clean Air Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 69 Stat. 322 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1964)); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485,
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 to 57j-3 (Supp. IV, 1969));
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (Mar. Supp. 1970).
52. The Commission rejected a similar argument in FCC Opinion Letter to Business
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, FCC No. 70-860 (Aug. 5, 1970), by not requiring a
broadcaster to sell spot announcement time for commercials urging the immediate withdrawal of
American forces in Vietnam. The FCC also has refused to permit those opposing Marine and Army
spot announcements to voice their opposition with free spot announcements. Fairness Doctrine
Ruling, 24 F.C.C.2d 156, 158 (1970).
53. The public must receive the necessary information to make an intelligent decision to buy a
product or to advocate a course of political action. Generally unfair or misleading advertising is the
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ruling or does not comply with the fair opportunity requirement, the Act
empowers the Commission to employ interim sanctions.Y The use of
these sanctions, such as the imposition of a fine or the suspension of a
license, are more effective ways to discipline a broadcaster than the
threat of revocation, which until 1968 had been utilized only once.' 5
Some commentators have argued it is unconstitutional to require
broadcasters to provide time for the expression of opposing viewpoints
on controversial issues because it has a "chilling" effect on the exercise
of first amendment rights. 56 They contend that the broadcaster will
simply refrain from presenting controversial subjects, rather than donate
the rebuttal time. This contention, however, has been discredited because
the "chilling" effect caused by the regular presentation requirement is
outweighed by the value of the information disseminated.57 Moreover,
this regular presentation solution would not introduce government
censorship into broadcasting because the mode, manner, and substantive
content of the antipollution announcements would remain in the
discretion of the individual broadcaster. 58 A further beneficial result of
requiring antipollution announcements on a regular basis would be the
elimination of possible private censorship, fostered by the economic
reliance of broadcasting companies on the automobile and gasoline
industries. 5' In conclusion, it is submitted that this solution is clearly
concern of the FTC, but the FCC may deny the renewal of a license to any broadcaster who
knowingly broadcasts a false advertisement, or does not identify paid commercials of political
broadcasts as such. See Note, supra note 13, at 711.
54. See note 23 supra.
55. See Renewal of AM and TV licenses, 14 F.C.C.2d 3 (1968) (Cox & Johnson dissenting).
56. See, e.g., Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of
Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. Rav. 67, 152 (1967); Sullivan, supra note 13. See
also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1968); 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964). Cf. FCC Memorandum, Opinion and Order, No. FCC
70-861 (Aug. 12, 1970); Anti-Defamation League, 9 F.C.C.2d 190 (1966), affd, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 390 (1969).
57. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Barren, In Defense of
"'Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's "'Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. COLO.
L. Rav. 31 (1964); Note, The Implications of the Extension of the Fairness Doctrine to Editorial
Expressions Implied in Commercial Advertising, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 452 (1970); Note, Fairness,
Freedom and Cigarette Advertising: A Defense of the Federal Communications Commission, 67
COLUM. L. Rav. 1470 (1967); cf. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982 (Cal.
1967).
58. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The fear that the Commission
would become the arbitrator of all issues is unfounded. Neither initially nor ultimately does the
Commission decide what is controversial-that decision remains with the public and their proxies,
the President and Congress.
59. "[S]tation owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make time
available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public issues, people
and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed. There is no sanctuary in
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within the FCC's statutory authority. The public interest obligation
imposed on the Commission by the Communications Act of 1934
requires that the public receive full and truthful information.6" In
addition, Congress has recently required federal agencies "to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony and fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of the
present and future generations of Americans."'" Regular presentation of
antipollution announcements as required by the fairness doctrine would
effectively implement these expressions of national policy.62
Constitutional Law -Establishment Clause-Tax Exemption for
Property Used Solely for Religious Purposes Held Constitutional
Plaintiff' sought to enjoin the New York City Tax Commission
from granting tax exemptions for church properties used solely for
religious worship. Plaintiff contended that the exemptions, which were
authorized by various state constitutional and statutory provisions,
2
the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all.
'Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not
sanction repression of that freedom by private interest.'" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 392 (1969), citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). See also M.
MILLER, THE JUDGES AND THE JUDGED 197-99 (1952). The power of the 100 largest American
corporations in broadcasting is tremendous. These companies control 85% of television advertising
time. See Statement on S.J. Res. 209, by Commissioner Johnson before the Subcommittee on
Communications of the Senate Commerce Committee 14 (Aug. 14, 1970). The argument that
requiring antipollution announcements would be the end of commercial television is without factual
basis. Even the cessation of cigarette advertising is predicted to have only a minor effect on
television revenues. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 15, 1970, at 1, col. 6 (S.W. ed.).
60. See notes 5-11 supra and accompanying text.
61. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A.. §§ 4321-47 (Mar. Supp.
1970).
62. "It is sad and somewhat disheartening that this Commission holds dearer the quantity of
commercial profits than the quality of human life itself." FCC Opinion Letter to Gary Soucie, No.
FCC 70-862, dissent at 13 (Aug. 5, 1970) (Comm'r Johnson).
1. Frederick Walz is a Bronx lawyer who purchased a 22 by 29 foot, weed-choked plot on
Staten Island and promptly sued the Tax Commission for his $5.24 tax bill for the year. N.Y.
Times, May 4, 1970, at 1, col. I (city ed.). Amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of Walz's
position by the ACLU, Madalyn Murray O'Hair, and the Society of Separationists, Inc.
2. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § I provides: "Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by
general laws. Exemptions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal
property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law and
owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for one or more of such
purposes and not operating for profits." This provision is implemented by N.Y. REAL PoP. TAX
LAW § 420(1) (McKinney Supp. 1970), which states in part: "Real property owned by a
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indirectly required him to financially support religious bodies in
violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment.3 The trial
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Both the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court4 and the New York
Court of Appeals 5 affirmed. On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, held, affirmed. A tax exemption for property used solely for
religious purposes, which is enacted with no intention to sponsor religion
and entails only minimal and remote involvement between church and
state, does not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment.
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Every state has either constitutional or statutory provisions
exempting from taxation property used solely for religious purposes,6
and no judicial decision has ever held that the exemptions violate the
establishment clause.7 This unbroken chain of precedents may partially
explain why the Supreme Court has never reached the merits of the exact
question presented in the instant case." The Court, however, has
frequently struggled to interpret the scope of the establishment clause
since its decision in Everson v. Board of Education,' in which a state
corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and
women, or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary,
educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library,
patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes. . . and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one
or more such purposes. . . shall be exempt from taxation as provided in this section."
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947), the Court incorporated the establishment clause into the fourteenth amendment, thus
making it binding upon the states. Appellant contested only the tax exemption of property used
solely for religious purposes. By doing this, appellant evidently intended to deny the Tax
Commission the argument that the property exempted served an educational or charitable purpose
as well as a religious purpose.
4. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 30 App. Div. 2d 778, 292 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1968).
5. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1969).
6. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 12-81(12) to (13) (1958); TENN. CONST. art. II,
§ 28 (permissive exemption); VA. CONST. art. XII, § 183 (mandatory exemption). For a further
presentation of state constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with religious property tax
exemptions see Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIO S.L.J. 461 (1959), Note,
Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 968 (1949), and Note, The
Establishment Dilemma: Exemption of Religiously Used Property, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 533
(1970).
7. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 685 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
8. Previously the Supreme Court had refused to hear cases appealed on the same issue
presented in Walz. See, e.g., Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal
dismissed sub nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956); Murray v. Comptroller of
Treas., 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966); General Fin. Corp. v.
Archetto, 93 R.I. 392, 176 A.2d 73 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962).
9. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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statute providing for payment of bus fares for parochial school children
was upheld. In the years following Everson, the Court has interpreted the
establishment clause in deciding the constitutionality of state statutes
incidentally aiding religious functions" and permitting the use of public
school time for religious instruction," prayer 12 and Bible reading 3 in
public schools, statutes requiring businesses to close on Sunday,, and
state office oaths requiring a declaration of belief in God.'5 An analysis
of these decisions reveals three identifiable theories on the requirements
of the establishment clause. 6 First, the "no-aid" doctrine, as stated in
Everson, assumes that the purpose of the establishment clause was to
erect "a wall of separation between church and State." This theory
dictates that government, in order to maintain this wall, cannot "pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.""17 Although a strictly literal interpretation of the "no-aid"
10. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (state statute providing for loans of
textbooks to parochial schools held constitutional).
11. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), a "released time"
program in which public school classrooms were used for religious instruction was held
unconstitutional on the ground that it used the tax-supported school system to aid religious groups
in spreading their faith. Later, in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), however, a statute was
held constitutional which merely permitted public schools to release students during the school day
to go to religious centers for instruction on a voluntary basis.
12. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state directive requiring an official prayer to be said
aloud in public school classes is contrary to the establishment clause).
13. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading and recitation by public
school children as part of the curricular activities of students is unconstitutional).
14. Sunday closing laws have been upheld. For example, in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961), the Court found that although the so-called "blue laws" may originally have been
enacted for religious reasons, the primary purpose of these laws today is secular in nature and does
not amount to an establishment of religion. Three other similar cases were decided along with
McGowan: Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617
(1961).
15. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) ("religious test for public office" violates
applicant's freedom of belief and religion).
16. These 3 theories are set forth in P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 59-79
(1964). See generally W. KATZ, RELIGIo & AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1963); P. KURLAND,
RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1967).
17. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). The often-quoted full citation reads: "The 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
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doctrine seems to preclude any type of aid, the doctrine in practice has
been used to nullify only those statutes expressly directed to religious
ends.'" Secondly, the theory of "neutrality" reemphasized by the Court
in School District v. Schempp,"1 requires government impartiality
between religious sects 2O and between believers and nonbelievers .2 The
Schempp decision adds the more useful idea that "to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion." The application of the "neutrality" theory has provided
latitude for governmental aid to religion when such aid was only
incidental to the accomplishment of a secular purpose. Thirdly, the
theory of "accommodation," which was first conceived in Zorach v.
Clauson,2' may be viewed as a pragmatic modification of the strictly
literal conceptualism of the "no-aid" and "neutrality" doctrines. The
Court stated in Zorach that the first amendment does not require
separation of church and state in every instance. 2 Rather, the Court
acknowledged the necessity of interrelationships between government
and religion and recognized that government cannot be completely
indifferent to religion in American life. This theory intimates that
government under certain circumstances "may accommodate its
institutions and programs to the religious interest of the people" without
unconstitutionally establishing religion in the process.? Proponents of
the proposition that tax exemptions for religious properties do not
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
church and State.'" Id. Jefferson's phrase, penned in a letter written in 1802 to a Baptist
association, was adopted by the Court in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), and
declared to be an authoritative declaration of the meaning of the first amendment. The expression
has been used in almost every case concerned with the establishment clause. E.g., cases cited notes 9-
13 supra.
18. Compare Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), with Illinois exrel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
19. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
20. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314
(1952), could find "no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be
hostile to religion and throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious
influence. The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects."
21. "That [First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power
is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); accord, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
22. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
23. 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
24. Id. at 312.
25. P. KAUJPER, supra note 16, at 69.
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violate the establishment clause have based their contentions on several
grounds.2 First, they have contended that the historic tradition of these
exemptions should be accorded substantial consideration. 2 Secondly,
authorities have argued that these exemptions reflect the state's
recognition of the socially beneficial manifestations of organized
religion, such as privately funded hospitals, homes for orphans and the
aged, and similar charitable pursuits. The thesis is that the property tax
exemption is justified since governmental interest is being served by
privately funded sources.28 Finally, it has been argued that taxation of
religious property, which is nonproductive of income, will cause the
forced sale of church property, thereby violating the free exercise clause,
which prohibits governmental interference with an individual's right to
pursue freely his religion.29 On the other hand, persons opposed to the tax
exemption of religious institutions base their contention on the
undisputed premise that a direct tax-funded subsidy of religion would
violate the establishment clause.30 Protagonists of the tax exemptions
26. The articles cited as authority for Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Walz are
particularly persuasive in support of religious tax exemptions. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the
Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969); Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1680 (1969); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment. and Doctrinal Development:
Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967); Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part IL The Nonestablishment Principle,
81 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1968).
27. Tax exemptions for religious properties existed during the lifetimes of writers of the
Constitution, and as early as 1802 Congress provided for tax exemptions for churches. Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 677 (1970). For a discussion of the history and development of the
establishment clause itself see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-30 (1962); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1947); and C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM
FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT (1964). See also Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and
Labor Legislation, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 144 (1949).
28. The most convincing justification of the property tax exemption on the basis of socially
valuable contributions by religious organizations is found in Murray v. Comptroller of Treas., 241
Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966). The Murray court reasoned that since
many functions of religious organizations are substantially beneficial to the community, churches
thereby save the State the expense of providing similar services. The court found that an entirely
secular state goal was achieved in encouraging church building and maintenance programs by
granting tax exemptions. This finding was supported by factual studies showing that church
buildings are thought to attract persons to communities and tend indirectly to increase the general
tax assessment base by raising land value in the neighborhood. Accord, J. TOBIN, W. HANNAN & L.
TOLMAN, THE EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION OF PRIVATELY OWNED REAL PROPERTY 56 (1934).
29. Mr. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Schempp, warned that in striking down
an activity deemed to be an establishment, a court might seriously interfere with the free exercise of
religion. 374 U.S. at 296.
30. "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions. ... Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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reason that since an exemption creates an .economic benefit, it is
logically tantamount to a direct subsidy and is thus unconstitutional .3
In the instant case, the Court interpreted the term establishment, as
used in the first amendment, to connote sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. In order to
accommodate the first amendment's guarantee of religious freedom with
the amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion, the
Court reasoned that there is an area of free interplay between the two
constitutional requirements in which benevolent neutrality of the
sovereign will permit religious exercise to exist with neither sponsorship
nor interference. In addition, the majority implemented the concept of
"neutrality" expounded in Schempp, which requires a value judgment
on a question involving the religion clauses to turn on whether particular
acts of government are intended to establish or interfere with religious
exercise or have the effect of doing so. In exercising this value judgment,
the Court, noting that deference should be given to state legislatures in
determining objectives of taxation, found that the New York legislature
had granted a property tax exemption not only to property used for
religious purposes but also to property owned by many other non-profit
organizations that provide beneficial services to the communityYs The
Court, however, expressly avoided justifying the property tax exemption
on the basis of the socially beneficial welfare services performed by
churches. Instead, the majority focused its attention on rebutting the
argument that a tax exemption is tantamount to a direct governmental
subsidy and thus unconstitutional. 33 The indirect economic benefit of a
tax exemption, the Court held, was qualitatively different from a direct
subsidy, which would necessarily involve sustained and detailed
administrative relationships. Moreover, the Court reasoned that a tax
exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between
church and state. Taxation of church property, on the other hand, would
31. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 461; Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded
Religion, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 968, 985 (1949). Two law review articles written during appeal stages
of the instant case took the position that the tax exemptions should be abolished. Note,
Constitutionality of the Real Property Church Exemption, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 430 (1970); Note,
The Establishment Dilemma: Exemption of Religiously Used Property, 4 SUFFOLK L. REV. 533
(1970).
32. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420(1) (McKinney Supp. 1970). The common
denominator of all of the exempted organizations was the nonprofit characteristic.
33. The majority was probably influenced by Boris Bittker's analysis of the weaknesss of the
anti-exemption reasoning. Bittker concluded that "the assertion that an exemption is equivalent to a
subsidy is untrue, meaningless, or circular, depending on context, unless we can agree on a 'correct'
or 'ideal' or 'normal' taxing structure as a benchmark from which to measure departures." Bittker,
supra note 26, at 1304.
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expand the involvement of government by necessitating valuation of the
property and giving rise to tax lien and foreclosure problems. For these
reasons, the majority concluded that the New York statute granting tax
exemptions to religious organizations for property used solely for
religious worship does not violate the first amendment. Mr. Justice
Douglas, the lone dissenter, 34 argued that the tax exemption is an
unconstitutional subsidy of religion.3 Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr.
Justice Harlan, in separate opinions, concurred in the majority's finding
but expressed different reasons for their conclusions.36
The instant decision is a significant step in the evolution of a
realistic approach for resolving questions that involve the religion
clauses of the first amendment. By conceptualizing the existence of an
area of free interplay between the establishment clause and the free
exercise clause, the Court has provided a neutral area in which the
government can operate without violating the Constitution. In contrast,
the theories advanced by some previous cases were based on
catchwords3 7 or implied that only a precipitous path existed between the
establishment and free exercise clauses.38 The instant decision becomes
even more desirable when it is recognized that the plaintiff's basic
assumption-that there is a distinct and separate classification of church
property used solely for religious purposes-is fallacious. Church
34. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas reiterated the belief, previously expressed in Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,443 (1962) (concurring opinion), that the Everson case, in which he voted with
the 5 to 4 majority, was "out of line with the First Amendment." Douglas seems convinced that any
aid to institutions teaching a sectarian creed is in violation of the establishment clause. 397 U.S. at
703.
35. Mr. Justice Douglas expressed the opinion that this Court had taken a step down the
establishment path, and that eventually churches would be "on the public payroll." 397 U.S. at
711. The majority took exception to this opinion noting that historically the tax exemption for
churches had never led to further involvement between church and state. Id. at 678. Although not
relying on the historic tradition of the church property tax exemption as conclusive proof of
constitutionality, the majority found that the long practice of such exemptions provided a
presumption of constitutionality that should not be cast aside lightly.
36. Mr. Justice Brennan distinguished the property tax exemption from a direct subsidy by
stating that a subsidy requires coercion of all taxpayers and involves a direct transfer of public
money. Thus, a subsidy is affirmative state action as compared with the passive nature of an
exemption. Brennan quoted Freund, supra note 26, at 1687 n.16, where it was stated that "the
symbolism of tax exemption is significant as a manifestation that organized religion is not expected
to support the state; by the same token the state is not expected to support the church." 397 U.S. at
691. Mr. Justice Harlan noted that subsidies, unlike exemptions, require periodic legislative debate
and thus invite more political controversy than exemptions. 397 U.S. at 699.
37. Mr. Justice Reed, the sole dissenter in McCollum, objected to the "wall of separation"
metaphor as used by the majority on the ground that "[a] rule of law should not be drawn from a
figure of speech." 333 U.S. at 247.
38. See generally Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) ("no-aid" doctrine).
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buildings serve secular purposes, such as providing a meeting place for
Boy Scout troops or headquarters for social welfare programs, as well as
religious purposes.39 In addition, since the voluntary contributions of
church members support many of these socially beneficial programs the
necessity of paying property taxes from donations would limit the
amount of privately funded charity work carried on by religious
organizations." Ultimately, government would have the responsibility
for filling the gap thereby created. In this context, however, it should be
observed that if the Court had invalidated the exemption, ultimately
property worth many billions of dollars would have become available for
tax assessment, 41 thus easing the constant pressure upon public officials
to find new sources of revenue. Although opponents of the tax exemption
have lost their judicial attempt to invalidate the exemption, they may
now undertake a legislative lobby for removal of the exemption. This
approach has considerable merit since the Court in the instant case
emphasized the discretion of state legislatures to determine the proper
objects of taxation. The Court indicated that it would be constitutional
for a state legislature to remove the exemption so long as the action was
taken in accordance with a proper secular policy. 42 Utilizing the
reasoning of the instant case, it also can be argued, however, that the
entanglement implicit in taxation of church property would significantly
hinder the free exercise of religion. The tax might be considered as a
price on the right to worship. As a result, some religious institutions
might be discriminated against if they were unable to afford the
additional cost of the house of worship. The instant decision may have a
profound effect upon the issue of whether federal aid to parochial
schools violates the Constitution. This issue is currently before the
Court, and the flexible approach articulated in the instant case should be
of considerable help to proponents of the aid. A strict "no-tax" holding,
on the other hand, probably would have required the converse "no-
support" holding in the case of aid to parochial education. 43
39. "Any assumption that a church building itself is used for exclusively religious activities,
however, rests on a simplistic view of ordinary church operations." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 688 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
40. See Giannella, supra note 26, at 553.
41. Approximately $880 billion worth of assessed real property exists in the United States. Of
that figure, approximately $79.5 billion is the cash or replacement value of real estate used by
religious institutions, according to a 1964 study by Dr. Martin Larson. M. LARSON, CHURCH
WEALTH AND BusINEss INcoii 47 (1965).
42. "Leaving churches outside the taxing boundary is no more an automatic violation of the
establishment clause. . . than locating them within the taxing statute is an automatic violation of
the free exercise clause." Bittker, supra note 26, at 1288.
43. See N.Y. Times, May 10, 1970, § 4, at 13, col. 6 (city ed.).
19701
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
Inescapably, cases involving religion elicit emotional responses, and a
consensus of public opinion" may tacitly influence a court decision in
this area. This fact, however, does not necessarily render the decision
invalid as lacking constitutional objectivity. Just as public values
molded the writing of the religion clauses of the Constitution, public
values may legitimately influence contemporary judicial interpretations
of those same clauses.
Constitutional Law-Voting-Durational Residency Requirement
Violates Equal Protection Clause
Plaintiff filed a class action requesting injunctive relief and a
declaratory judgment invalidating as unconstitutional the state
durational residency requirements for voting.' Two and one-half weeks
after moving to Tennessee, 2 plaintiff attempted to register to vote in the
upcoming primary election3 but was declared ineligible pursuant to a
state law requiring that individuals reside in the State for one year and in
the county for three months prior to voting in any election .4 After an
unsuccessful appeal to the local election commission,5 plaintiff instituted
the instant suit. Plaintiff contended that both the three-month and one-
year residency requirements violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The State argued that the plaintiff's challenge to
44. L. PFEFFER, supra note 16, at 216-17 (public opinion, which generally approves and
supports the exemption from property tax, has been a significant factor in its continuation).
1. Plaintiff did not question the State's power to insure that voters are bona fide residents of
the State. Cf., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (a state's power to insure that potential
voters are bona fide residents does not allow the state to exclude servicemen moving into the state
from voting). At issue is the validity of durational residency requirements-whether a citizen must
reside in a given locality for a specified period before becoming eligible to vote.
2. Plaintiff moved to Tennessee to become an assistant professor at Vanderbilt Law School.
Since plaintiff intended to remain in Nashville indefinitely, it was not disputed that he was a bona
fide resident of the county and state.
3. The primary election was being held to select candidates for governor, United States
Senate and House of Representatives, and state representatives. A general election also was being
held to select many state and local officers.
4. TENN. CONST. art. IV, § I provides in part: "Every person of the age of twenty-one years,
being a citizen of the United States, and a resident of this State for twelve months, and of the county
wherein such person may offer to vote for three months, next preceeding the day of election, shall be
entitled to vote. ... See also TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-201, -304 (Supp. 1969) (reiterating the
constitutional provisions).
5. Plaintiff's appeal to the election commission exhausted the administrative remedies
available for correcting the registrar's decision under TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-319 (1956).
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the validity of the three-month requirement was moot, 6 and that
durational residency requirements are necessary to insure the purity of
the ballot box 7 and thus represent a valid exercise of state power. The
three-judge federal court, held, judgment for plaintiff. Durational
residency requirements for voting are not necessary to promote any
compelling state interest and therefore violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Blumstein v. Ellington, No. 5815 (M.D.
Tenn. Aug. 31, 1970), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3150 (U.S. Oct.
13, 1970) (No. 769).
Although the right to vote is not specifically guaranteed by the
United States Constitution, it has been scrupulously protected by the
courts. The Supreme Court has recognized that this right is fundamental
to individual liberty.8 Despite the importance of the right to vote, states
traditionally have been granted broad power to specify reasonable
requirements for voting.9 Once a state has granted voting rights,
however, any classification that discriminates against a recipient of the
franchise may violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 10 The courts have utilized two standards to evaluate
challenges based on equal protection grounds.11 Under the traditional
test, a statute that fosters discrimination is unconstitutional unless it
furthers some state interest. To comply with this standard, it is not
necessary that the classification created be the most precise or practical
6. Prior to the August 6th election, the court declined to issue a preliminary injunction to
require the state to allow plaintiff's class to vote, indicating that to reopen registration rolls on the
eve of the election would be "so obviously disruptive as to constitate an example of judicial
improvidence." Blumstein v. Ellington, No. 5815 (M.D. Tenn., Aug. 31, 1970). After the election,
the State contended that the 3-month requirement was moot because the August 6th election already
had been held and plaintiff would satisfy the residency requirement before the November election.
7. States traditionally argue that durational residency requirements are necessary in order to
prevent dual voting, to insure that voters are familiar with local candidates and issues, and to curtail
"colonization of voters"-importing nonresident to vote for a particular candidate.
8. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886), the Court indicated by way of dictum
that voting is a fundamental political right because it is preservative of all other rights. See also
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (serviceman has fundamental right to vote in state of
residence); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904) (durational residency requirement does not
violate fundamental right to vote).
9. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (literacy test for
voting upheld as fair on face). See also note 27 infra.
10. E.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (disfranchising nonproperty
owners in election to authorize issuance of general obligation bonds); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-69 (1966) (poll tax disfranchised citizens who failed to pay).
11. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969). For a
history of the early development of the equal protection clause see Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
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method to accomplish a specified goal. 12 The traditional test has
normally been employed to examine legislative regulation of the
economy.'3 Under the second standard, which is commonly denoted as
the "compelling interest test," the courts have held that a discriminatory
statute is constitutional only if it is necessary to promote a compelling
state interest and if the class created by the statute is defined so that it is
neither over- nor under-inclusive. 14 A statute that includes more people
within the defined class than are necessary to accomplish the compelling
state interest is over-inclusive, while a statute whose burden falls on some
members of the class and excludes others is under-inclusive. 5 Courts
have consistently applied the compelling interest test more stringently
than the traditional test. 6 The stricter standard, for example, often has
been employed in situations when a statute has created a classification
based upon suspect criteria, such as race, 7 wealth, s" or lineage, 9 or when
a statutory classification has affected fundamental liberties, such as the
12. For example, a state may conserve funds by denying benefits to an unnecessarily large
number of welfare recipients. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), noted in 23 VAND. L.
REv. 1390 (1970) (upheld imprecise classification denying or reducing AFDC benefits to potential
recipients). A state also may produce income by levying taxes on a somewhat arbitrary basis.
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913) (licensing fee for theater
based on price of tickets sold). But see Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 361-64 (1970) (requirement
that a school board member be a property owner was so unreasonable that it was unconstitutional
even under the traditional test).
13. E.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (statute that allowed only American Express
money orders to be sold in local stores held to deny equal protection of the laws); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (upheld statute prohibiting bottling of gas taken
from below certain depth). But see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (utilizing the
traditional test to evaluate a classification allegedly denying AFDC payments to some otherwise
qualified indigents).
14. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69-70 (1968) (interpretation of statute that
would prohibit illegitimate children from bringing a wrongful death action for the loss of a parent
held to be an unconstitutional, invidious discrimination); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09
(1966) (statute forcing only incarcerated convicts to pay the cost of the transcript in an unsuccessful
appeal invalidated because the classification was under-inclusive).
15. For a discussion of the nature of under- and over-inclusive classifications see
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1084-88 (1969).
16. Compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190-96 (1964) (no compelling interest
justifying state prohibition of black-white cohabitation), with McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 806-07 (1969) (followed traditional test holding that the legislature might
have rational reasons for denying absentee ballots to citizens in pretrial confinement within their
county of residence).
17. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
18. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
19. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
1970] RECENT CASES
right to procreate,20 travel,21 or vote.Y Prior to 1965,23 the traditional test
was utilized to uphold durational residency requirements.U Since that
time, however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that the more
exacting compelling interest standard should be applied to judge
legislative classifications that impair voting rights.25 Accordingly, a
federal district court in Massachusetts in Burg v. Canniffe 2  recently
applied the compelling interest standard to invalidate the state's one-
year residency requirement for voting. The Supreme Court recently had
the opportunity to examine durational residency requirements for voting
under this standard but dismissed the case without reaching the merits of
the constitutional question. 27 The judiciary has not been the only
20. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
21. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
22. E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). But cf. McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (applied the traditional test to uphold an absentee ballot statute that
resulted in the denial of the right to vote to citizens held in pretrial confinement).
23. Prior to the introduction of the compelling interest test into voting rights litigation, the
Court relied on the traditional equal protection test to protect voting rights. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) (reapportionment of state legislature). Other constitutional provisions were also utilized.
E.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (reapportionment of congressional districts
required by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
24. For instance, the Supreme Court has twice upheld Maryland's durational residency
requirement in pre-1965 cases. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633-34 (1904); Drueding v. Devlin,
234 F. Supp. 721, 723-24 (D. Md. 1964), affdper curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
25. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (citizens who paid no real property
tax disfranchised in city election to issue general obligation bonds); Evans v. Cornman, 396 U.S.
812 (1970) (residents of federal enclave disfranchised); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701
(1969) (citizens who paid no real property tax disfranchised in election to issue municipal revenue
bonds); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (citizens who owned or
leased no taxable real property and had no children in school disfranchised in school district
election); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (statute discriminating against minor political
parties in placing candidates on ballot); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(citizens who failed to pay poll tax disfranchised); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (residents
in military who in-migrated disfranchised). The Court has ordered that many kinds of electoral
districts be reapportioned under the compelling interest test. E.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474 (1968).
26. No. 69-855-C (D. Mass., July 8, 1970). The statute in question provided for 6-months'
residence in the state in addition to 6-months' residence, locally, thus requiring a total of a year's
residence in the state. The court did not consider the 6-month local requirement.
27. In Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969), a 3-judge court upheld the constitutionality of
Colorado's 6-month durational residency requirement. The Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction, but when the state legislature reduced the required residency period to 2 months, the
Court by a 6 to 2 decision dismissed the case as moot. For discussions of the validity of durational
residency requirements for voting see Macleod & Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements
and Civil Rights, 38 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 93 (1969); Note, The Impact and Constitutionality of
Voter Residence Requirements as Applied to Certain Intrastate Movers, 43 IND. L.J. 901 (1968);
Note, State Residency Requirements and the Right to Vote in Presidential Elections, 58 Ky. L.J.
300 (1970); Comment, Residence Requirements for Voting in Presidential Elections, 37 U. Cm. L.
REv. 359 (1970).
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governmental branch to scrutinize durational residency requirements as
a condition for voting. In the Voting Rights Act of 1970,28 Congress
prohibited durational requirements as a prerequisite to voting for the
President and Vice President. The Act expressly states that such
requirements are not based on a compelling state interest and therefore
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2'
Although durational residency requirements have previously been
challenged on constitutional grounds, aggrieved plaintiffs generally have
been handicapped in obtaining judicial resolution of the constitutional
issue by the judiciary's adherence to the doctrine of mootness.3 In Hall
v. Beals, 3 1 for example, the Supreme Court dismissed as moot an attack
on a durational residency requirementz The problem of mootness in
voting rights cases, however, has occasionally been overcome by
utilizing the doctrine that an issue "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" is not moot.33 In 1969, the Supreme Court invoked this
28. Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 202-04, 84 Stat. 314. The Act recently was upheld as
constitutional in Christopher v. Mitchell, 39 U.S.L.W. 2196 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 1970).
29. "[T]he imposition and application of the durational residency requirement as a
precondition to voting for the offices of President and Vice President, and the lack of sufficient
opportunities for absentee registration and absentee balloting in presidential elections-
(1) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to vote for their President
and Vice President;
(2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement
across State lines;
(3) denies or abridges the privileges and immunities guaranteed to the citizens of each State
under article IV, section 2, clause 1, of the Constitution;
(4) in some instances has the impermissible purpose or effect of denying citizens the right to
vote for such officers because of the way they might vote;
(5) has the effect of denying to citizens the equality of civil rights, and due process and equal
protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment; and
(6) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct of
Presidential elections." Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 202, 84 Stat. 314.
30. The Supreme Court has held that article III, section 2 of the Constitution, which lists
cases and controversies that come within the judicial power of the United States, prohibits
consideration of cases in which one of the litigants no longer has a stake in the outcome. Cf. Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Therefore, a plaintiff whose cause is heard after the election is
over, or after he has completed the required period of residence, may find his challenge dismissed as
moot. For a discussion of the mootness problem see Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme
Court, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1672 (1970).
31. 3 6 U.S. 45 (1969).
32. The case was mooted, however, not because the election was over and plaintiff had
satisfied the residency requirement, but because the statute challenged had been amended. See also
Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41 (1969) (refusal to examine a statute discriminating against
independent electors because the plaintiff had sued for mandamus only and relief could no longer
be granted).
33. The "capable of repetition" doctrine originated in Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC,
219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
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concept to reach the constitutional challenge to a statute discriminating
against independent electors, even though the election that presented the
issue already had been held.Y
In the instant case, the court initially found that none of the policies
underlying the mootness doctrine would be served by refusing to decide
the controversy. The court concluded, therefore, that it should decide the
case on the merits since the issue was likely to recur.3 After reaching this
decision, the court held that since the plaintiff was still a member of the
class of citizens who had lived in the county for less than three months,
he had standing to represent that class. Turning to the plaintiff's
constitutional challenge to the durational residency requirements, 36 the
court noted that a balance must be sought between the individual's right
to vote and the state's power to regulate voting requirements. The court
further found that recent decisions firmly establish the compelling
interest test as the applicable equal protection standard when the right to
vote is at stake.37 Applying this standard, 3 the court concluded that
durational residency requirements do not support a compelling state
interest because they are not necessary to insure the purity of the ballot
box.3' The court, therefore, declared these requirements unconstitutional
as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The instant decision is the most definitive judicial pronouncement
that durational residency requirements for voting are unconstitutional.
Coupled with the Massachusetts decision in Burg v. Canniffe10 and the
34. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969). See also Carroll v. President & Comm'rs, 393
U.S. 175 (1968) (injunction preventing political rally for 10 days vacated after expiration); Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (criminal conviction overturned after plaintiff had completed his 6-
month sentence).
35. The court found that Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969), was not controlling since that case
was dismissed as moot only because the statute under consideration had been superseded. The court
buttressed its decision by citing Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41 (1969), which was decided the
same day as Hall. The Court dismissed Brockington as moot because the plaintiff sued for
mandamus to have his name added to the ballot in the 1968 election. The Court indicated that the
outcome might have been different had plaintiff brought a class action or sued for declaratory relief
to invalidate the statute.
36. The court took judicial notice of the fact that the durational residency requirements
applied to the right to register as well as the right to vote.
37. The court indicated that Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (1964), affdper curiam,
380 U.S. 125 (1965), which upheld durational residency requirements under the traditional test, was
no longer a viable precedent.
38. The court indicated that a classification based on length of residence may be suspect, but
cited only the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658
(1969), in support of that holding.
39. The court indicated that the system of voter registration is adequate to prevent dual
voting, and, therefore, durational residency requirements are surplusage.
40. 39 U.S.L.W. 2059 (D. Mass., July 8, 1970). In Burg, the court invalidated only the one-
year state requirement, leaving the 6-month local requirement intact.
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Voting Rights Act of 1970, the court's holding will provide future
plaintiffs4 with strong and persuasive authority on which to base
challenges to durational residency requirements for voting. If the instant
decision is widely followed, the political implications will undoubtedly
be significant since statistics indicate that five to eight million voters
have been disfranchised by such requirements in recent elections.
2
Furthermore, this decision may encourage constitutional challenges to
similar requirements in other areas.4 3 Under the rationale of this
decision, for example, the validity of residency requirements for
obtaining medical assistance, judicial relief, or engaging in the practice
of a profession may be questionable 4 since these requirements do not
appear to support d compelling state interest.4 5 Although the instant
decision will be useful to support this argument, it would have been a
more valuable precedent if the court had held that durational residency
41. The case has provided the impetus for similar suits in other states, since every state has
durational residency requirements for voting. E.g., Hadnott v. Amos, 39 U.S.L.W. 2263 (M.D.
Ala. Oct. 19, 1970) (6-month county and 3-month precinct residency requirements for voting violate
the equal protection clause); Buford v. Holton, 39 U.S.L.W. 2253 (E.D. Va: Oct. 27, 1970) (one-
year voter residency requirement violates equal protection clause); Macleod & Wilberding, supra
note 27, at 96-97 (table indicating prevailing requirements in each state). An analogous situation
developed when a 3-judge court in Maryland invalidated the State's maximum grant AFDC
provision. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968), rev'd, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). On
the heels of that decision, comparable regulations were successfully challenged in several states.
Lindsey v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 1203 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F. Supp. 1109
(D. Me. 1969); Dews v. Henry, 297 F. Supp. 587 (D. Ariz. 1969). As additional suits were filed,
maximum grant provisions were quickly repealed in other states. See Robinson v. Hackney, 307 F.
Supp. 1249 (S.D. Tex. 1969). Thus, by the time the Supreme Court reversed Williams, there were
few maximum grant provisions still in effect.
42. Macleod & Wilberding, supra note 27, at 93; Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for
Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile Society, 61 MICH. L. REv. 823, 829 (1963); Comment, supra
note 27, at 360. There are indications that a high percentage of young, black, and other traditionally
Democratic voters are in the class affected. Id.
43. See Cole v. Housing Auth., 312 F. Supp. 692, 703 (D.R.I. 1970) (2-year residency
requirement for eligibility to live in low-rent public housing violates the equal protection clause).
44. States have mustered several arguments to justify durational residency requirements for
voting, such as the need for familiarity with local issues and candidates and the need to protect
against dual voting. See note 27 supra.
45. Although legislative history usually does not indicate the rationale behind durational
residency requirements for obtaining occupational licenses, members of the group regulated
frequently lobby for such restrictions to enhance economic security by limiting competition and to
foster social recognition. See generally Monaghan, The Constitution and Occupational Licensing in
Massachusetts, 41 B.U.L. Rev. 157, 167 (1961). It is difficult to imagine a compelling state interest
served by Hawaii's one-year requirement for embalmers (HAWAII REv. LAWS § 469-1 (1968)), or
California's 2-year residency requirement for obtaining a license as a collection agency manager
(CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6886 (West 1964)). See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN THE WEST 3,23,28 (1964). See also note 48 infra.
Durational residency requirements for abortions and divorces are justified as measures to prevent
local hospitals and courts from being overworked.
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requirements constitute an unconstitutional abridgement of the right to
travel." Although the prospect of temporary disfranchisement may not
deter many persons from changing residences,4 7 it can be plausibly
argued that any unnecessary interference with a constitutionally
protected right is invalid. While the right to travel argument was not
specifically considered in the instant case, in the future it may be the
primary basis for challenging durational residency requirements in other
fields.48 The instant decision is also significant for its liberal
interpretation of the mootness doctrine. In this regard, the court
specifically found that since the class involved would be adversely
affected by the statute as long as it remained in effect, the "controversy"
would correspondingly retain vitality until such time as the statute might
be invalidated. The court's decision thus intimates that the use of a class
action in itself may prevent a case from being dismissed as moot,49 and
hence the decision opens a viable avenue for future challenges to
durational residency requirements. Unlike the instant case, however,
these future challenges may still be subject to dismissal if the plaintiff is
no longer a member of the class at the time the case is heard. 0
Creditors' Rights-Attachment-Prejudgment Attachment of
Chattels Without Prior Notice and Hearing Violates Due
Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff, conditional vendee, sought to permanently enjoin the
enforcement of a New York statute1 that authorized the prejudgment
46. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating durational residency
requirements for receiving public welfare).
47. For a discussion of whether residence requirements for voting constitute a "penalty" on
the right to travel see Comment, supra note 27, at 380-82.
48. E.g., Keenan v. North Carolina Bd. of Law Examiners, 39 U.S.L.W. 2193 (E.D.N.C.
Oct. 2, 1970) (one-year residency requirement as a prerequisite for taking bar examination
invalidated as a violation of the constitutional right to travel and the equal protection clause).
49. The court based its holding on the Supreme Court's decision in Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45
(1969), and Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41 (1969). See note 35 supra.
50. Because the Supreme Court has not been clear or consistent in erecting the barriers of
mootness and standing (see Note, supra note 30), anomalous situations arise. For example, if a
lower court upholds the validity of a durational residency statute, the Supreme Court can dismiss
the attack on appeal without considering the constitutional issues by noting that the plaintiff has
since satisfied the residency requirement and that the question is therefore moot. However, if a lower
court declares such a statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court, in order to reverse, must either
determine that the issue was moot when first decided or pass on the constitutional question.
1. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 7101-11 (McKinney 1963).
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attachment of a debtor's property without providing for prior notice and
a hearing.2 Prior to the commencement of the plaintiff's suit, the
defendant-creditor had instituted a replevin action seeking to repossess
certain household furnishings 3 sold to the plaintiff under a conditional
sales contract. Pursuant to the New York statute and at the defendant's
request, 4 a local sheriff had sought to levy an attachment on the chattels
in question but had been temporarily enjoined by a federal district judge.
In seeking to make the injunction permanent, plaintiff contended that, in
light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Sniadach v. Family
,Finance Corp.,5 the statutory provision for seizing property prior to
notice and a hearing violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.6 The defendant maintained that the statute was
constitutional since it afforded adequate procedural safeguards for
debtor property rights 7 and since the attachment procedure it authorized
had become established through tradition as a legitimate collection
device.8 Upon trial before a three-judge panel of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York, held, the statute is
unconstitutional. 9 A prejudgment atachment of a debtor's chattels
without prior notice and a hearing violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F.
Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
Attachment was originated in medieval England10 as a device for
2. Three actions involving similar facts were joined for heanng.
3. The furnishings included a bed, box-spring and matress, highchair, chest, dinette set, stove,
refrigerator, rug, end-tables, chair, and record player.
4. Prior to attaching an alleged debtor's property, the creditor was statutorily required to
deliver to the sheriff an affidavit and requisition describing the property and to post a bond. N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. LAW § 7102 (McKinney 1963).
5. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (Wisconsin statute permitting prejudgment garnishment of wages
without prior notice or hearing violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
6. The plaintiff also raised the following contentions: (1) that the searches and seizures
incident to the attachment violated the fourth amendment (see N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7110
(McKinney 1963) (allowing sheriff to break open buildings and seize chattels without a warrant))
and (2) that the requirement that the debtor post bond violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment (see N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7103(McKinney 1963)).
7. The alleged safeguards presumably included the statutory requirements that the creditor
post bond and sign an affidavit and that the sheriff hold the property for 3 days prior to delivering it
to the creditor. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7102 (McKinney 1963).
8. The defendant claimed that the statute had descended from a replevin statute codified in
1788. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 721 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
9. In addition to invalidating the statute on due process grounds, the court found that it
violated the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment. Id. at 722. The court failed to
reach the equal protection contentions.
10. "Foreign attachment" was the procedure established in the middle ages for reaching non-
resident merchants' property under the control of a third party. S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS'
REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 177 (1967).
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compelling a defendant to appear in court." In the nineteenth
century, garnishment developed as an outgrowth of attachment, and
today they are both primarily statutory remedies. 2 Although the two
procedures are functionally similar, they are nevertheless
distinguishable. An attachment seizes a debtor's property in his
possession, whereas a garnishment seizes the funds, effects, or credits of
a debtor in the possession of a third person. While garnishment is used
primarily as a collection device that often avoids suit on a debt, 3
attachment serves two other functions: (1) to gain in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction 4 over debtors, and (2) to prevent fraudulent conveyances by
debtors in the anticipation of adverse judgments. It is a well established
proposition that in order to permanently deprive a person of his
property, due process requires the giving of adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard.' 5 Although traditionally these general
requirements have been transgressed only in instances of compelling
public policy,' 6 the Supreme Court, in 1928, indicated in McKay v.
Mclnnes7 that a prejudgment attachment does not violate due process
because the deprivation is only temporary and serves notice upon the
debtor. For 40 years, the Mclnnes rule stood unqualified and was
11. The defendant's property would be attached, and if he did not appear to defend in the suit,
the property would be forfeited to the state, and not to the plaintiff as is the custom today. Note,
Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 945 (1970).
12. Forty-one states have garnishment or attachment statutes. Brunn, Wage Garnishment
in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1222, 1250-53 (1965).
See also Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U.S. 334 (1902) (state legislatures decide when the attachment
remedy is available).
13. Employees frequently realize that a garnishment places unpleasant burdens on the
employer and therefore often seek to settle their accounts when threatened with garnishment. Note,
Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REv. 743, 749 (1968).
14. An in rem action is brought against the property itself, as when the plaintiff alleges a
claim to the title; a quasi in rem action is one in which the plaintiff has property of the defendant
attached in order to acquire personal jurisdiction. A subsequent judgment against an absentee
defendant may be satisfied only to the extent of the value of the property attached. F. JAMES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 21,644 (1965).
15. See, e.g., Shroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (due process requires notice
and an opportunity to be heard); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (an
opportunity to be heard is of little value without actual notice).
16. See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (public interest in preserving the credit
of a bank overrides the requirement of giving notice in seizing an ill-managed bank); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (compelling public interest may authorize summary action
subject to later judicial review); North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908)
(seizure without notice by public health inspector of decayed food sold for human consumption
upheld).
17. 279 U.S. 820, affgper curiam 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928) (attachment of real estate
and corporate stock does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). See also
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (attachment of stock of non-resident upheld).
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consistently reinforced by judicial decisions.'" Finally in 1969, in the
landmark case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.," the Supreme
Court held that due process requires that a debtor be afforded the benefit
of a hearing prior to a prejudgment wage garnishment. In reaching its
decision, the Court distinguished Mclnnes by indicating that wages are a
"special" form of property whose loss can create severe hardship. The
question immediately raised by scholars was whether the scope of
Sniadach would be expanded to encompass debtors' property other than
wages.? Recently, in Klim v. Jones,2  a federal district court in
California, recognizing the inequity inherent in seizing an alleged
debtor's property without a hearing, invalidated an innkeeper's lien
statute, which permitted immediate seizure of a lodger's personal effects
upon nonpayment of rent. The Klim decision extended the rationale of
Sniadach outside the context of wage garnishment to that of attachment
of chattels. More recently, however, in Fuentes v. Faircloth,2 a Florida
district court distinguished the Sniadach decision and upheld the
constitutionality of a replevin statute permitting the repossession of
chattels without affording a prior hearing. In.reaching this conclusion,
the court reasoned that the hardship attendant to a unilateral freezing of
wages was a fundamental prerequisite to the Sniadach decision and that
this hardship is clearly lacking when the property seized23 is not essential
for day-to-day living. Thus an unequivocal limitation was engrafted onto
the rule of Sniadach.
In the instant case, the court extended the rationale of the Sniadach
decision to prejudgment attachments of household furnishings.
Reasoning that goods necessary for ordinary day-to-day living are, like
wages in Sniadach, a "specialized type of property," the court
concluded that to permit their taking "on the unilateral command of an
adverse party 'may impose severe haraships' on purchasers of these
essentials."2 4 The court determined, therefore, that due process required
the giving of notice and an opportunity to be heard before a legitimate
seizure of the plaintiff's property could be effectuated. 2 Turning to the
18. E.g., Schillachi v. Olesen, 161 F. Supp. 227, 231 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Nicoma Park Tel. Co.
v. State, 198 Okla. 445, 180 P.2d 626 (1947).
19. 395 U.S. 337 (1969), noted in 22 VAND. L. REv. 1400 (1969).
20. See, e.g., Hawkland, Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages After Sniadach, 75 CoM. L.J.
5,7 (1970).
21. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
22. 317 F. Supp. 954 (D. Fla. 1970).
23. The property seized in Fuentes included a gas stove and a stereo set. Deprivation of the
same type of property was held to impose the requisite hardship in Laprease.
24. 315 F. Supp. at 722-23.
25. The court indicated that a full evidentiary hearing was not necessary, but rather that the
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defendant's contention that the procedure authorized in the New York
statute had become established through tradition, the court pointed out
that age alone does not insulate legal customs from attack.
26
Recognizing that the debtor could still be deprived of the use of his
property for "a theoretical minimum of 4 days," the court reasoned that
the posting of a creditor's bond would not ameliorate the hardship of
this deprivation. Since the New York statute authorized the seizure of
property without prior notice or a hearing, the court held that it violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Upon synthesizing the instant decision with Sniadach, three
significant observations become apparent that warrant independent
analysis and discussion. First, both decisions involved a "special" type
of debtor's property categorized as necessary for day-to-day existence.
Secondly, both decisions recognized that the respective facts presented
involved no "special" creditor or state interest that might justify a
prompt attachment without prior notice to the debtor. Thirdly, both
decisions indicated that whenever the two foregoing conditions are
present in a prejudgment attachment or garnishment, due process
commands that the alleged debtor be given notice and an opportunity to
assert defenses prior to being deprived of his property. Having identified
these fundamental similarities between Laprease and Sniadach, it
becomes desirable to project and to analyze the significant implications
that may flow therefrom.
In regard to the first condition-the "special" nature of the
property involved-both Laprease and Sniadach intimated that the due
process clause draws a qualitative distinction between stoves and
refrigerators on the one hand and oil wells and IBM stock on the other.
With this distinction, the courts have implicitly indicated that due
process of law affords greater protection to the poor than to the
wealthy. 27 To suggest that due process discriminates among the classes of
people it protects is anomalous, and future courts may be logically
compelled to disregard this distinction and require prior notice and a
hearing for all prejudgment attachments, regardless of the type of
property involved. If the courts should resolve, however, to confine the
minimum requirement of due process would be met by an ex parte hearing before a judge or court
showing the justification for attachment. Id. at 723.
26. The court cited Justice Black's dissent in Sniadach to support this proposition. 395 U.S.
at 350.
27. The plaintiff in Laprease was a welfare recipient and the chattel was indispensable to her.
If the plaintiff had not been poor, the court probably would have reached a different result. See note
24 supra and accompanying text.
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prior hearing requirement to poor debtors only, then the reasoning of
Laprease and Sniadach concerning what property is protected would
serve as a convenient means of limitation. In order to further insulate the
interests of the poor in retaining properties necessary for day-to-day
living, courts may go beyond the hearing requirement and extend the
right to counsel to all preattachment hearings. Since the purpose of these
hearings is obviously to protect the rights of the debtor, the debtor
should be represented by counsel so that his rights will in fact be
protected through the effective assertion of defenses. It has been argued
that a right to state-provided counsel in civil litigation may be the next
constitutional right to be recognized by federal courts. 2 Whether this
right wilt eventually be acknowledged and whether the presence of a
hardship to the debtor will continually be recognized as a condition
precedent to preattachment hearings will ultimately depend upon the
willingness of the judiciary to apply an anomalous distinction among
classes of debtors protected by the due process clause.
In reference to the second condition-the absence of a "special"
creditor or state interest-both Laprease and Sniadach imply that the
presence of such interests would obviate the necessity of providing notice
and hearing prior to an attachment. In determining whether a given
interest is "special," the overriding test should be whether the interests
of the creditor or state would be irreparably harmed by requiring the
giving of prior notice. It is submitted that irreparable harm would occur
only in instances where prompt attachment is required. In situations
involving possessory liens, for example, to require that notice be given
prior to attachment could conceivably remove any possibility of
recovery by the creditor.29 Similarly, prior notice may be impossible or
impractical in in rem and quasi in rem actions because the debtor has
often left the jurisdiction for parts unknown. In such instances, at least
constructive notice of the attachment should be obligatory, 30 and, of
course, if the debtor's whereabouts later become known, actual notice
28. E.g., Note, Attachment and Garnishment, 68 MICH. L. REv. 986, 1008-09 (1970). The
rationale underlying this right would be similar to that in criminal trials.
29. This analysis indicates that Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970), was
decided improperly since the innkeeper therein involved had a "special" interest in seizing the
debtor-lodger's belongings without notice. To require prior notice in Klim was to afford the debtor
ample opportunity to leave the inn and perhaps the jurisdiction with his property without paying his
bill. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. On the other hand, Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F.
Supp. 954 (D. Fla. 1970) involved no "special" creditor interest and should have required prior
notice and a hearing. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.




and a hearing should be afforded. 31 An additional factor that courts
should consider in determining when a "special" interest exists is the
seriousness of the potential injuries that notice or lack of notice may
precipitate. For instance, if the creditor would stand to suffer only
pecuniary damage while the debtor would lose the use of property of
substantial intrinsic value, the debtor's interest would appear to be
paramount. 3 The possible existence of such circumstances manifests
that the hearing requirement should be liberally invoked and dispensed
with only in circumstances in which a prompt attachment is absolutely
essential to the prevention of irreparable injury to the creditor.
Having considered the two cqnditions that are fundamental to the
Laprease and Sniadach decisions, the question next becomes whether the
courts will broadly interpret those conditions. By extending the
application of the notice and hearing requirement, courts could clearly
provide greater protection to debtors by diminishing the unfair coercive
advantage presently available to creditors,33 without appreciably
jeopardizing creditors' rights. Under the majority of state statutes, the
only protection currently afforded a debtor prior to attachment is the
requirement that a creditor's bond be posted, usually in an amount equal
to twice the value of the property to be attached. By requiring such
bonds, the statutes clearly deter fraudulent attachments to some extent,
but they do not effectively neutralize the creditor's unilateral power to
threaten to garnishee or attach the debtor's property.m Moreover, many
of these bonding statutes also require the posting of debtors' bonds3 and
thereby discourage impoverished debtors from asserting valid defenses.
In addition, as the court in Laprease recognized, the posting of a
creditor's bond does not discount the fact that the debtor may be
completely deprived of the use of his property from the time of
attachment until the eventual rendition of judgment. Thus, it is
commendable that the Laprease decision has established that mere
compliance with a bonding statute will not satisfy due process
requirements in prejudgment attachments. Because the scope of the
31. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
32. See Note, Provisional Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.: A Constitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 426, 431
(1970).
33. The displeasure of employers in administering garnishment is a substantial threat to the
employee and a powerful weapon for the creditor. Note, supra note 13, at 743.
34. See Note, Prejudgment Wage Garnishment: Notice and Hearing Requirements under
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., I I B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 462,463-64 (1970).
35. Note, supra note 28, at 1009.
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Laprease decision includes such areas as the repossession of secured
collateral governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, the hearing
requirement could conceivably increase the judicial workload to a
considerable extent. It is important to observe, however, that since most
preattachment hearings will be of summary nature, the incidental
administrative burden should not outweigh the need for adequate
safeguard's for debtor property rights. Presently, the only limitation
imposed by the U.C.C. upon repossession is a general proscription
against breaches of the peace with no distinction being made concerning
the type of property seized or the necessity of a prompt repossession.
36 It
is submitted that even though a given transaction may involve a security
agreement within the ambit of the Code, the debtor should be given an
opportunity to assert any defenses that may have arisen since the
execution of the agreement.3 7 Besides encompassing attachments
pursuant to security interests under the U.C.C., the Laprease- Sniadach
rationale should also logically extend to the area of post-judgment
garnishment and attachment. 8 While the argument for a prior hearing in
post-judgment proceedings is less compelling than in the prejudgment
context because the debtor has presumably "had his day in court," the
argument is nevertheless viable, for the debtor may have valid defenses
that have arisen since the judgment was rendered. For example, the
attachment may breach a post-judgment settlement between the parties
or violate an exemption statute.39 It is submitted, therefore, that even in
post-judgment situations, due process requires the giving of notice and a
hearing prior to seizure of a debtor's property unless a "special"
creditor or state interest is involved.
36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503.
37. For example, the breach of an accord orally agreed upon after default would be a valid
defense.
38. Note, supra note 28, at 1012.
39. E.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1673-75 (Supp. IV,
1969), places a maximum limit of the amount of wages garnishable and prohibits the firing of an
employee for garnishment on a single indebtedness. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDrr CODE
§ 5.104 (giving a debtor greater protections). Federal laws also exempt payments received
under various welfare programs such as the Social Security Act or the Veterans' Benefits Act.
Social Security Act § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1964); Veterans' Benefits Act § I, 38
U.S.C. § 3101 (1964). The preponderant majority of states grant homestead and life insurance
exemptions, and 3 states completely exempt unpaid wages from creditor claims. For an incisive
discussion of the various exemptions see S. RIESENFELD, supra note 10, at 230-64.
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Criminal Procedure -Probation Revocation-Revocation of
Probation Without a Limited Hearing Violates Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Petitioner was convicted of burglary and placed on probation for
five years.1 Subsequently, his probation was revoked without a hearing.
2
After exhausting state remedies, 3 petitioner brought a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus4 in federal court, contending that the revocation of his
probation without a hearing was a denial of due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment. 5 The state maintained that since probation was a
privilege and not a right, its revocation could be made summarily. The
district court' denied relief. On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held, reversed. Revocation of probation
without a limited hearing to determine if probation conditions were
violated denies the probationer his constitutional right to due process of
law. Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970).
The constitutional requirements for probation revocation have
received little attention by the Supreme Court. In the two cases in which
the question was presented, the Court suggested in dicta that there was
no constitutional due process requirement for a hearing before the
1. The Wisconsin probation order is unclear from the reported opinion. Petitioner apparently
was directed to return to Illinois, where his mother was residing, and practice his trade of barbering.
Illinois did not accept him as a probationer. Petitioner, who claimed he misunderstood the
probation order and thought that it barred his return to Wisconsin, went to California.
2. The Department of Public Welfare, evidently viewing the flight to California as a violation
of probation, acted pursuant to the following statute: "If a probationer in its charge violates the
conditions of his probation, the department may order him brought before the court for sentence
. . . or if already sentenced may order him to prison. . . a copy of the order of the department shall
be sufficient authority for the officer executing it to take the probationer . . . to prison." Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 57.03 (1957).
3. Petitioner's petition for a writ of error coram nobis was denied by the Circuit Court for
Clark County in February, 1968. The Wisconsin Supreme Court treated the appeal of this denial as
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied it. Neither of these 2 decisions are reported. See
Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970).
4. Petitioner brought suit under authority of a federal statute on habeas corpus which read:
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the appellant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State. ... 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
5. Petitioner raised 3 major objections in his appeal. In addition to his due process claim, he
objected to the failure of the State courts to appoint counsel for him for his appeal. He also claimed
that Wisconsin, by extraditing him to Illinois for trial on charges there, had waived jurisdiction over
him and had no power to jail him on his return from Illinois. Wisconsin did incarcerate petitioner on
his return from Illinois but subsequently gave him probation again.
6. This decision was by the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. It is
unreported.
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revocation of probation. 7 As early as 1935, the Court in Escoe v. Zerbst'
reasoned that since probation was instituted for federal prisoners by the
Federal Probation Act,' it is not a right but a privilege granted by
Congress. The Court, therefore, found that Congress could dispense with
notice or a hearing as part of the procedure of probation. In both Escoe0
and Burns v. United States," however, the Court emphasized that
probation revocation cannot be arbitrary or lacking in substantive due
process. Moreover, the assertive language of Escoe indicating that
procedural due process is not required in probation revocation was
dictum because the Court found that a hearing was required on statutory
rather than constitutional grounds.' 2 Nevertheless, the Escoe right-
privilege distinction has been followed by most federal courts13 in
denying that there is a due process right to a hearing before revocation of
conditional liberty, which includes parole, probation, and conditional
pardon. 4 Only two federal decisions have found a constitutional right to
such a hearing, and both of these cases can be distinguished. 5 Similarly,
7. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
8. 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651, 3653-55 (1964).
10. "[T]here shall be an inquiry so fitted in its range . . . as to justify the conclusion that
discretion has not been abused. ... 295 U.S. at 493.
11. "[T]he probationer is entitled to fair treatment, and is not to be made the victim of whim
or caprice." 287 U.S. 216, 223 (1932).
12. The statute provided for the probationer to be "brought before the court" after a
violation of the terms of the probation had been alleged. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1964). The Court in
Escoe interpreted this to mean that the probationer had a statutory right to attempt to "explain
away" the allegations against him. 295 U.S. at 493.
13. The federal declarations in the area were either dicta (e.g., United States v. Markovich,
348 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1965); Bennett v. United States, 158 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1946)) or an
interpretation of state law (e.g., Linton v. Cox, 358 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1966)). For a discussion of
federal probation procedure see Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation
Hearings, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964).
14. Many courts and most commentators have viewed parole, probation, and conditional
pardon as being separate parts of the same concept, that of conditional liberty. See, e.g., Weihofen,
Revoking Probation, Parole or Pardon Without a Hearing, 32 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 531 (1942);
Note, Parole Revocation Procedure, 65 HARV. L. REv. 309 (1951); Comment, Revocation of
Conditional Liberty-California and the Federal System, 28 S. CAL. L. REv. 158 (1954). Many
courts in handling parole violations have relied on the Escoe right-privilege classification. E.g., Rose
v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967);
Richardson v. Markley, 339 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1965); Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964).
The Rose and Richardson cases both include dicta barring due process claims in probation
revocation.
15. One case, Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941), was distinguished by the
court of decision in the later case of Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
946 (1968), holding that a conditional pardon was different from parole or probation because there
was no supervision of the conditionally pardoned prisoner. The other case, Hollandsworth v. United
States, 34 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1929), was decided before Escoe.
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state courts have rarely found a constitutional requirement for a hearing
before revocation of probation.' 6 The majority of state courts have used
the right-privilege distinction to deny the right to a hearing.' 7 A few
courts, however, have used the contract theory of probation as the basis
for rejecting constitutional claims.18 Under this theory, which is largely
discredited, when a defendant is granted probation he enters into a
contract with the state to follow the probation conditions. The state can
imprison the probationer who violates his probation contract."
Although most states, in practice, conduct some type of hearing before
i'evoking conditional liberty, 20 these hearings are generally held in
compliance with statutory2l rather than constitutional law. The Escoe
right-privilege classification has been used extensively by the Supreme
Court in denying procedural protection to "privileges" in other areas of
the law.22 In recent years, however, there has been a growing disfavor
with the distinction,s and a new test for determining whether procedural
due process will be required has gradually evolved. One Justice of the
16. There are only 3 jurisdictions in which a constitutional right to a hearing before probation
revocation has been recognized. See Exparte Lucero, 23 N.M. 433, 168 P. 713 (1917); State v.
Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (1927); State v. Shannon, 60 Wash. 2d 883, 376 P.2d 646
(1962). The only other jurisdictions in which there have been required hearings have had statutes
expressly providing for hearing (see, e.g., N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 935 (McKinney Supp. 1970);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 55-595 to -596 (1962)) or have had statutes with wording similar to the
"brought before the court" phrasing of the federal statute (see Miss. CODE ANN. § 4004-25 (Supp.
1968); NEv. REV. STAT. § 176.215 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1084 (1964)).
17. See, e.g., Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937) (suspension of sentence);
Curtis v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1164, 131 N.W.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 958 (1965) (parole
revocation); Exparte Boyd, 73 Okla. Crim. 441, 122 P.2d 162 (1942) (suspension of sentence).
18. This theory stems from dicta by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Wilson, 32
U.S. 150 (1833).
19. See Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899); People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138
N.W. 1044 (1912). The Supreme Court in Burns held, however, that probation was a "matter of
favor, not of contract." 287 U.S. at 220.
20. See Sklar, supra note 13.
21. Currently, only 2 states specifically provide for a revocation procedure without a hearing.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 247.26 (1969) (probation may be revoked at any time without notice); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 549.101 (Supp. 1969) (probation may be revoked with or without a hearing). The
statutes of 7 states are silent on the problem and these have generally been interpreted not to require
a hearing. See. e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1657 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West
1970). In all the other states, some type of hearing is held according to statutes. The substance and
safeguards of these hearings vary greatly. For a fairly recent compilation of the statutes in this area,
see Sklar, supra note 13.
22. E.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (physician's license revocation);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (admission of an alien);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (detention of an alien).)
23. The criticisms of the right-privilege distinction are excellently presented in Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439
(1968). See also Comment, supra note 14.
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Supreme Court rejected the classification test in a 1951 case,, and
outlined the factors to be weighed in considering the elements of due
process required in a particular situation.? Ten years later, the Court
followed this lead in Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy,26 holding
that a balancing of the government function and the private interest
involved must be made in determining the procedures that due process
may require. More recently, in Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court said
that a constitutional challenge could not be answered by the argument
that public assistance benefits were a "privilege" and not a "right." The
Court's most recent pronouncement was in Goldberg v. Kelly,"8 a
welfare case where the recipient demanded a hearing before benefits were
discontinued. Declaring that the recipient was "immediately desperate,"
the Court concluded that the extent of due process required "depends
upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss [of status]
outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. 29 Thus,
while the courts have overwhelmingly rejected claims of a constitutional
right to a hearing on revocation of conditional liberty, the right-privilege
classification relied on by most courts has been all but specifically
rejected by the Supreme Court.
In the instant case, the court, after disposing of some collateral
contentions,30 found that Escoe's rejection of a right to a hearing was not
binding. Noting the erosion of the right-privilege distinction by recent
Supreme Court decisions, the court further found that essential due
process no longer turns on the distinction between a privilege and a
right.3' The court applied the Goldberg balancing test after observing
24. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
25. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, proposed a 6-point standard. Factors to be
considered were: (1) the nature of the interest involved; (2) the manner in which the interest was
adversely affected; (3) the reason why the interest was disturbed; (4) the availability of an
alternative; (5) the protection implicit in the office of the functionary involved; and (6) a general
balancing of the interests involved. Id. at 163.
26. 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (worker was summarily barred from place of work for security
reasons).
27. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare payments were denied because of a one-year residency
requirement).
28. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
29. Id. at 263.
30. The court found that the indigent counsel claim was not valid on its merits and that it
could not rule on the jurisdictional claim because petitioner had not exhausted state remedies on
that issue. See note 4 supra. The court also preliminarily indicated that there was no mootness
because the revocation of probation was still on petitioner's criminal record. The court ruled that
jurisdictional requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964), were satisfied because petitioner filed
his habeas corpus petition while in prison. 430 F.2d at 102.
31. The court also dismissed the contract theory of probation as a reason for denying the
hearing. 430 F.2d at 104.
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that the probationer who is denied his liberty is at least as "immediately
desperate" as the welfare recipient was in Goldberg. The court
concluded that petitioner's loss of freedom outweighed the burden on the
state of providing a limited hearing before revocation of probation. It
held, therefore, that the due process clause requires a limited
hearing-where the probationer can be confronted with his probation
violation and can be heard-before the revocation of his probation.
The instant case rationally applies recent Supreme Court decisions
on due process to an area of the law that has been permeated by the
dubious right-privilege distinction. This ritualized test of classifying a
status as either a "right" or a "privilege" was too compartmentalized
to provide a useful guideline for determining due process requirements.
In place of this antiquated classification, the instant case applies the
balancing test to probation revocations. The decision, however, leaves
several questions unanswered. First, the opinion does not consider the
important question of what must take place at the required limited
hearing. Significantly, the Supreme Court already has upheld the right
to counsel in a probation revocation hearing. 32 Other procedural
safeguards, such as the right to a jury trial, the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, the right to notice of the hearing, and the right
to subpoena witnesses and evidence, inevitably will be examined in future
cases. It is submitted that notice and the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses should be available since it is essential that the
probationer have time to prepare for the hearing and be able to confront
witnesses, whose testimony is often the basis for probation revocation.
Secondly, the decision leaves unanswered the question of whether there
should be differentiation between probation revocations that involve
factual questions and those that present legal questions. The fact-finding
hearing should more closely approximate a full hearing, complete with
the rules of evidence, because determination of facts probably will be
more conclusive if it is necessary to appeal the decision. Thirdly, the
expense of providing for revocation hearings seems to have been
disregarded by the court.3 The expense of these hearings may be used as
an argument to limit their scope. Finally, the decision does not face the
problem that judges may limit or eliminate the discretionary grant of
probation because they may be subsequently faced with a
constitutionally required revocation hearing. It has been suggested that
32. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
33. The court alluded to the problem superficially. 430 F.2d at 104. See Warren, Probation in
the Federal System of Criminal Justice, 19 FED. PROB. 3 (Sept. 1955).
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judicial economy in the face of an overburdened docket may dictate the
curtailment of probation grants.u
Assuming that the Supreme Court adopts the reasoning of the
instant case, the requirement of a limited hearing before probation
revocation will have widespread significance in the area of conditional
liberty. Just as the Escoe case was applied broadly to all facets of
conditional liberty,3 including parole, conditional pardon, and proba-
tion, a High Court affirmance of this case presumably would be held
controlling in the entire area. Moreover, such a decision might be the
first step in the eventual requirement of a full hearing before probation
revocation is allowed. Several policy arguments have been advanced
against having a full hearing,3 including the expense and administrative
difficulties that would be involved. In the area of parole, for example,
court or administrative officers would be required to spend a
considerable amount of time testifying at hearings, instead of carrying
out their supervisory functions. A further policy argument that has been
made against a full hearing results from concern for the safety of
witnesses.37 These arguments are clearly outweighed, however, because
the rehabilitative function of the conditional liberty concept should not
be compromised by an arbitrary revocation procedure that breeds
distrust in probationers. A full hearing, possibly including a jury, is
necessary to insure that probation is revoked only in necessary instances.
Even though the problems of overcrowded dockets would be aggravated
by a required full hearing, these problems should not be used to justify
trampling on the rights of probationers and parolees. Furthermore, the
requirement of a full hearing for probation revocation may prove to be a
further incentive to eliminate the problems of judicial administration
and overcrowded dockets. Regardless of the instant decision's unsettling
effects on the field of conditional liberty, its recognition of a
probationer's constitutional right to a hearing before the revocation of
his probation is commendable. In the future, the procedural safeguards
to which a probationer is entitled before revocation of probation will not
34. This argument has been effectively rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. That court
questioned "[w]hy should any honest judge adopt such a policy? The very suggestion shows a lack of
confidence in the integrity of our courts, which we do not share." McPhie v. Turner, 10 Utah 2d
237, 240, 351 P.2d 91, 93 (1960).
35. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
36. For an excellent summary of the policy arguments on both sides of this question see
Sklar, supra note 13.
37. Id. at 195. This argument is meritless, especially since the same problem is faced every
day in criminal courts throughout the country.
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depend on what state he happens to be in, 38 but rather on juidical
interpretation of what the Constitution requires.
Criminal Procedure -Search and Seizure-Warrantless Search
Conducted at Police Station Valid as Continuation of Prior Search
Incident to Arrest or as Inventory of Property Held in Custody
Appellant was convicted of possessing counterfeit bills' that were
found in his suitcase during a warrantless search conducted at the local
police station. At the time of appellant's arrest an initial unproductive
search of his motel room and suitcases was made. 2 In order to comply
with local practice, 3 appellant and his personal articles were then
removed to the police station where a more intensive search of one
suitcase revealed the incriminating evidence inside a glove. Upon trial,
appellant contended that his fourth amendment right of security against
unreasonable search and seizure4 had been violated and that the evidence
should therefore be suppressed. The United States District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee upheld the initial search of the motel room
as incident to appellant's arrest, but failed to determine the legality of
38. The state statutory guarantees range from "summary and informal hearing . . . not
subject to the rules of evidence or of pleadings" (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1134 (1954)) to a written
notice of the charges and a court-appointed attorney if necessary and a "reasonable time [for
probationer] to prepare his defense" (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-200.1 (Supp. 1969)). See note 21 supra
and accompanying text.
I. The Federal Counterfeiting Law, 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1964) provides: "Whoever. . . keeps
in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or other
security of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
fifteen years, or both."
2. Appellant and 3 companions were registered at a Memphis motel. The manager's
suspicions were aroused when appellant used a credit card to charge an unusually expensive
breakfast. In addition, the manager found that the license number appellant gave at the desk upon
registration was incorrect. Investigation revealed that the credit card along with a loaded pistol and
other items of personal property had recently been stolen from a Memphis resident. Summoned by
the motel manager, local police used a passkey to enter the 2 rooms of the appellant and his
companions, where they were arrested and searched. United States v. Robbins, 424 F.2d 57, 58
(6th Cir. 1970).
3. Local practice was to allow the arrestees to make a telephone call within an hour of arrest.
The first search was interrupted to allow compliance with this practice. Id.
4. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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the search conducted at the police station. 5 On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where the salient question
was whether the second search was constitutionally sanctioned, held,
affirmed.6 When police conduct a warrantless search of any arrestee's
property at the police station subsequent to the arrest, the search is valid
either as a continuation of the prior search incident to the arrest or as an
inventory of property held in custody. United States v. Robbins, 424
F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1970).
The determination of what searches are reasonable when conducted
without a warrant has been the subject of considerable judicial
controversy. The Supreme Court first approved the warrantless search
incident to an arrest by way of dictum in a 1914 decision, Weeks v.
United States.7 In 1925, the dictum in two cases8 extended the
permissible scope of warrantless searches beyond the person of the
arrestee to the area within his control. Shortly thereafter, in Marron v.
United States,9 the area of authorized search was further broadened to
encompass the "place where the arrest is made." Two prohibition era
cases'O temporarily qualified this power by holding that an arrest cannot
be used as a pretext to search for evidence. Subsequently, however, the
Court again broadened its guidelines, in Harris v. United States," by
sustaining the warrantless search of a man's entire house as incident to
arrest on the theory that the house was within his "control." Justice
Frankfurter registered a strong dissent, 2 questioning where the line of
limitation can reasonably be drawn when a search is permitted to extend
5. It is unclear how the trial court reached its decision on the charge of possession of
counterfeit bills without first making a determination as to the validity of the search that produced
the sole evidence on which the charge was based.
6. The appellate court heard arguments on the issues of the validity of the arrest, the detention
before arraignment, the first search, and the second search. 424 F.2d at 58.
7. 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (unlawful to break into a person's house and search through his effects
without a search warrant).
8. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
9. 275 U.S. 192 (1927). In Marron, federal agents with warrants to search for liquor
discovered a ledger dealing with illicit liquor transactions which, though not expressly mentioned in
the warrants, was admitted as evidence obtained through a valid search incident to arrest.
10. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (the room in which the arrest was made
was rifled for books, papers, and other evidence of soliciting illicit liquor trade); Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (officers under false color of warrant entered the office of
a company, arrested 2 of its officials, and made a general search of the premises).
11. 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (5-4 decision sustaining a conviction for illegal possession of selective
service documents obtained in a warrantless search that had been directed towards another crime).
12. Id. at 167. Justice Frankfurter felt that the Court was giving retroactive legality on the
basis of what the illegal search uncovered.
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beyond the person of the arrestee. A year later, the Court regressed to a
more restrictive position, announcing that a warrantless search is invalid
whenever it is practicable to obtain a warrant. 3 Two years later, in
United States v. Rabinowitz,14 the Court shifted its emphasis from the
warrant to the nature of the search, despite the forceful dissenting views
of Justice Frankfurter. 5 The critical test became "not whether it [was]
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was
reasonable."' 6 This flexible rule had been unchallenged for fourteen
years when the decision in Preston v. United States 7 dramatically
narrowed the justification for warrantless searches to the need to seize
weapons or prevent destruction of evidence. The clear implication of this
decision was that a warrantless search incident to an arrest had to be
substantially contemporaneous with and confined to the immediate
vicinity of the arrest. 8 Most lower courts, however, continued to rely on
the loosely defined search limitations laid down in Rabinowitz9 and
allowed warrantless searches of entire premises on which arrests were
made. 20 In contrast to this permissive development in searches incident
to arrest, the Supreme Court had meanwhile allowed warrantless
searches in the related field of "stop and frisk" to extend only as far as
required by the original justification for initiating the search. 2' In 1969,
these two trends converged in Chimel v. California,z2 in which the Court
endorsed Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Harris and Rabinowitz to
amplify its concern with searches that go "beyond the area from which
13. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (even objects in plain view cannot be
seized without a warrant when there had been time to get one).
14. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Concluding that reasonableness should be determined independently
of the amendment's warrant requirements, the majority affirmed a conviction of a stamp dealer for
forging "overprints" on postage stamps found in an extensive warrantless search that had been
directed toward another purpose.
15. 339 U.S. at 68 (Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting). "With all respect I suggest that it
makes a mockery of the Fourth Amendment to sanction search without a search warrant merely
because of the legality of the arrest." Id. at 70.
16. Id. at 66.
17. 376 U.S. 364 (1964). The Court unanimously overturned the conviction of the defendants,
who had been arrested on a vagrancy charge while sitting in a parked automobile, for conspiring to
rob a bank, largely on evidence obtained by a warrantless search of their car in the police garage
after they had been taken into custody.
18. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,486 (1964).
19. See generally Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth
Amendment, 28 U. CHt. L. REv. 664 (1961).
20. See 16 LOYOLA L. REv. 217 (1970).
21. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). See also Note, Search and Seizure, 21 CAsE W.
RES. L. REv. 366 (1970),
22. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items." Since
the fourth amendment suggests no rational limitation once this happens,
the Court ruled that a warrantless search must be contemporaneous with
the arrest and confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrestee to be
constitutionally justifiable.
24
In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit initially ratified the district
court's determination that the preliminary search was valid as incident
to the appellant's lawful arrest. The court then reasoned that because the
first search had been interrupted solely to permit compliance with a local
requirement, the subsequent search, which produced the incriminating
evidence, was merely a continuation of the initial search and therefore
was valid even though it was remote in time and place from the arrest. 2
Alternatively, the validity of the second search was upheld as a routine
police inventory procedure. The lone dissenter rejected both the
continuation and inventory theories of the majority and determined that
the search conducted at the police station was clearly invalid under the
Chimel guidelines.
2
The instant court was presented with an opportunity to reevaluate
the law of search and seizure in accordance with the policies enunciated
in Chimel.27 Instead of doing so, it side-stepped the challenge presented
with a holding that is at best questionable. It is apparent from Supreme
Court and Sixth Circuit decisions that mere possession of the accused's
property does not confer on authorities the right to conduct a
warrantless search;2s additionally, it is clear that an initial search remote
from the point of arrest is invalid?* Thus, the crucial inquiry becomes in
what way, if any, are the policy considerations underlying search
incident to arrest significantly altered by a perfinctory search at the time
23. Id. at 766.
24. See Note, Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 626 (1970).
25. In so concluding, the court distinguished Colosimo v. Perini, 415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir.
1969), vacated, 38 U.S.L.W. 3520 (U.S. June 20, 1970), a prior Sixth Circuit decision which
declared unreasonable a search of an automobile at the scene of arrest but remote in time from the
arrest. According to the court, the distinction between the instant case and Colosimo is that in the
former the search began contemporaneously with the arrest and continued at a subsequent time,
while in the latter there was no initial search at the time of the arrest. 424 F.2d at 59.
26. 424 F.2d at 59 (McCree, J., dissenting).
27. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
28. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Colosimo v. Perini, 415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir.
1969), vacated, 38 U.S.L.W. 3520 (U.S. June 20, 1970) (holding search of impounded car
subsequent to arrest unreasonable).
29. United States v. Cain, 332 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1964) (car searched in police garage after
arrest of accused on the street held invalid); see Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (holding
search of hotel room 2 days prior to arrest too remote).
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of arrest. The resolution of this issue necessarily involves a balancing of
the individual's right to be secure from an unreasonable search against
the public interest in unhampered investigation of crime.30 Chimel has
instructed that the right of personal privacy is paramount unless the
search incident to arrest is compelled to safeguard the arresting officer or
the public.3 I Therefore, technical distinctions attempting to justify a
remote search as a continuation of one contemporaneous with an arrest
run counter to the basic policies underlying the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement.32 Under the instant court's ruling,
extensive warrantless searches could be arranged by the police merely by
interrupting a cursory search at the time of arrest for some plausible
excuse, only to return later for a more exhaustive search unfettered by
constitutional safeguards. There are no logical temporal or spacial
limitations to such a theory.3 The only limit to the use of such tactics
would appear to be police self-restraint, which is questionable in view of
the repeated abuses of the Rabinowitz principle through the
arrangement of arrests in such a way that arrestees would be considered
"in control" of any area that the police wished to search.3 4 Although
such procedures are highly effective in law enforcement, all too often the
persuasiveness of evidence obtained in this manner has a retroactive
influence in determining the validity of the search. Even if the continued
search concept of the instant case is tempered by subsequent judicial
rulings to suppress evidence found, it would fail to meet constitutional
requirements, since the fundamental purpose of the fourth amendment is
to prevent unreasonable intrusions by law enforcement officers, rather
than to censure them in retrospective examinations.3 As a result of the
holding in the instant case, it becomes necessary to choose whether to
reject the court's decision or adopt the idea that an individual's fourth
amendment rights cease at the time of his arrest. The alternative
determination that the search remote from the arrest was valid as a
police inventory also ignores the reasons underlying the warrantless
30. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (search without warrant invalid
when a warrant could have been secured).
31. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see Simeone, The "'New" Rules on Searches
Incident to Arrest, 25 Mo. B.J. 566 (1969).
32. Compare Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 921
(1970), with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947).
33. See Davis v. United States, 423 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1970). In Davis. decided 2 days after
the instant decision, the majority rejected the government's argument that a post-arrest search could
be a valid continuation of a search incident to arrest.
34. See Note, supra note 24, at 632-33.
35. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758 (1969).
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search. The chief justification for inventory procedures is to protect
police from false charges of theft; however, this type of police protection
should not override basic constitutional guarantees of privacy.',
Although there is sporadic judicial authority supporting the inventory
theory as a legitimate basis for search,3 7 these cases were decided prior to
Chimel and were limited to situations in which a statute required
forfeiture of the arrestee's property.
The instant decision should not be judged, however, solely in the
light of Chimel, but rather in the context of a half century of judicial
vacillation and inconsistency. 38 Two decades ago, Rabinowitz was
praised as a decision that sought to bring all searches within the
framework of the fourth amendment;39 just as Rabinowitz failed to fulfill
this purpose, so may Chimel. Heavy case loads and overcrowded dockets
may be responsible, but the lower courts have been largely unresponsive
to the obvious need for more sensitive guidelines in the area of
warrantless searches.49 From this perspective, the instant decision can be
viewed as merely another innuendo in the judiciary's struggle with the
fourth amendment, the duration of which must create considerable
doubt as to the Court's ability to cope with the problem and some
indication that federal legislation may be needed to conclusively
delineate the permissible scope of warrantless searches.41
36. The inventory theory as a basis for warrantless search is dealt with at length in the recent
Tenth Circuit case of Faubion v. United States, 424 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1970), in which the majority
rejected the inventory argument. See also See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (both cases recognizing that the name or alleged purpose of the official
intrusion could not insulate it from constitutional requirements). See generally Note, supra note 24.
37. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (search of a car held valid a week after
arrest since the car was being held pending forfeiture and was closely related to the reason for which
the accused was arrested). Contra, Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 921 (1970) (search of defendant's clothes stored by police several days after arrest held
invalid as not contemporaneous with the arrest).
38. Two very recent decisions are typical of the apparent inconsistencies in the guidelines the
Court has been-laying down. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), suspects were arrested
in their automobile on a dark street, and for the safety of the arresting officers the suspects and their
automobile were taken directly to the police station where in the presence of the suspects the car was
searched. These circumstances convinced the majority of the Court that the search should be upheld,
over the strong dissent of Justice Harlan. In Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), the Court in a 6
to 2 decision declared illegal the search of the defendant's house, despite the fact that the arresting
officers had every reason to expect to find the drugs that were found, and also despite the fact that
the mother and brother of the arrestee were in the house and could easily have hidden or destroyed
the drugs before a search warrant could have been obtained.
39. See Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28
U. Ci. L. REV. 664 (1961).
40. Id. at 690. After Rabinowitz, the lower courts created broad categories of "searches,"
which were presumed to be reasonable and thereby avoided evaluating the scope of each individual
search.
41. See id. at 705-06 (1961).
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National Banks-National Banks Need Not Comply With State
Banking Laws When Seeking to Relocate Principal Office and
Retain the Former as a Branch
Appellants' sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the
Comptroller of the Currency from issuing a certificate of authority that
would permit Prospect Park National Bank (PPNB) to relocate its
principal office and to prevent the bank from making such a move.
PPN B had submitted simultaneous applications pursuant to sections 302
and 36(c)(2)3 of the National Banking Act to the Comptroller of the
Currency seeking approval of a proposed plan to move its main office
from a static urban community to an expanding suburban community, 4
and to retain the former principal office as a branch. Appellants
contended that the proposed move would be forbidden to state banking
associations by state statute s and thus the issuance of a certificate of
authority by the Comptroller should be enjoined on the ground that
section 30 must be construed with and limited by section 36(c)(2), which
incorporates state standards in determining whether a national bank
should be permitted to branch.6 Appellee asserted that the proposed
1. The appellants are Ramapo Bank, Broadway Bank & Trust Co., New Jersey Bank, and the
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Banking & Insurance, the plaintiff intervenor. The
Ramapo Bank and Broadway Bank & Trust Co. are banking corporations of the State of New
Jersey, and the New Jersey Bank is a national banking association.
2. "Any national banking association, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency,
may change the location of the main office of such association to any other location outside the
limits of the city, town, or village in which it is located, but not more than thirty miles distant, by
vote of shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock of such association." 12 U.S.C. § 30 (1964).
3. "A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, establish and operate new branches. . . (2) at any point within the State in which said
association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to state banks
by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority
affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to
location imposed by the law of the State on State banks." 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(2) (1964).
4. Appellee bank is the only bank located in Prospect Park, a highly urbanized borough
bordering Patterson, New Jersey. Prospect Park has a population of 5,200 that has remained
constant since 1930. Wayne Township where appellee wanted to establish its main office, is a large
suburban community with a population that has increased from 11,822 in 1950 to approximately
47,000 in 1968. Wayne is served by 6 banking offices, including those of appellants.
5. The express statutory law of New Jersey prohibits the establishment of branch offices by
state banking institutions in any municipality, other than that in which the principal office is
located, if another bank has its principal office situated there. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-19(B)(3)
(Supp. 1970). Furthermore, a state bank may not relocate its principal office outside of the
municipality in which it is located. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:9A-22 to -23 (1963).
6. Appellants also asserted that they were entitled to a trial de novo in district court on the
ground that in all instances in which an agency hearing is not subject to the procedural requirements
of § 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act a trial de novo is required. 5 U.S.C. § 556-57 (Supp.
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relocation was governed solely by section 30, which makes no reference
to state statutory law as a limit on the relocation of a national bank's
main office. Following an informal hearing in which the Comptroller
determined that the applications fully comported with the requirements
of sections 30 and 36(c)(2), 7 appellants initiated the instant action. In
granting appellee's motion for summary judgment, the district court
sustained the approvals given by the Comptroller and declined to grant
injunctive relief.' On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, held, affirmed. There is no requirement that a national bank
must comply with state branch banking statutes when seeking to
relocate its principal office and retain its former headquarters as a
branch. Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 39
U.S.L.W. 3147 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970).
Although it was early resolved that Congress had the authority to
regulate national banks without regard to state laws,' the original
national banking act was not enacted until 1863.10 This act, however, did
not permit national banks to relocate their headquarters or to establish
branches. In 1886, Congress recognized this shortcoming and adopted a
statute, now section 30 of the National Banking Act, that vested the
Comptroller of the Currency with the power to approve the relocation of
a national bank's principal office.' This statute permitted the relocation
of a main office anywhere within a 30-mile radius of the original site
without regard to municipal boundaries. In response to the urgings of
national banking associations,12 Congress adopted the McFadden Act in
1927, which permitted national banks to establish branch banks within
municipal limits if the appropriate state statutory law accorded the same
privilege to state banking associations.13 As conceived by its sponsor, the
IV, 1969). The court dismissed this contention because it found the record amply supported the
district court's approval of the Comptroller's findings.
7. The Comptroller is not required to conduct a hearing by the National Banking Act and the
question of whether to hold a hearing is wholly discretionary with the Comptroller. Establishment
of Branch Banks and Seasonal Agencies, 12 C.F.R. § 4.5 (1970). At the request of appellants, the
Comptroller's regional office conducted an informal hearing on August 20, 1968. The Comptroller
made an independent examination of the record and on April 8, 1969, issued an opinion approving
the applications of appellee bank.
8. Ramapo Bank v. Camp, Civil No. 423-69 (D.N.J. May 19, 1969).
9. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
10. National Banking Act, 12 Stat. 665 (1863).
11. Act of May 1, 1886, ch. 73, § 2, 24 Stat. 18, as amended 12 U.S.C. § 30 (1964). The
reason for the enactment of this amendment was to relieve Congress of the necessity of enacting a
special law each time a national bank desired to change its location or name. See 17 CONG. REC.
1349-51 (1886).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 83, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1926).
13. National Banking Act of 1927, ch. 191, § 7(c), 44 Stat. 1228, as amended 12
U.S.C. § 36(c)(2) (1964).
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McFadden Act, the relevant part of which has been codified as section
36(c)(2) of the National Banking Act, was designed to allow the national
and state banks to compete freely without a statutory advantage being
accorded to either type of association. 4 In 1933, the National Banking
Act was further expanded to allow statewide branching by national
banks to the extent that state banking institutions were permitted to
branch by the express statutory law of the particular state. 5 This
amendment was deemed necessary to place national and state banking
associations more nearly in a state of competitive equality by removing
the restriction on statewide branching by national banks."6 Section 30 of
the National Banking Act was amended in 1959 to require the express
approval of the Comptroller as a condition precedent to the relocation of
a national bank's principal office within the limits of the city in which it
was located.' 7 Although broad discretion has been accorded the
Comptroller in the field of national banking, his authority is not without
limitations. 8 His findings are subject to judicial review, and his rulings
frequently have been 'reversed. Several courts, for example, have held
that the Comptroller exceeded his authority by approving a national
bank's application to branch into an area prohibited to state banks by
state statutory law."9 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has invalidated a
Comptroller's certificate that would have permitted a national bank to
branch into a city by means other than taking over an established bank
as required by state law.2 Although a number of courts have construed
14. On the occasion of the enactment of the McFadden Act, its sponsor stated that
"competitive equality has been established among all the members of the Federal reserve system."
68 CONG. REc. 5815 (1927) (remarks of Representative McFadden).
15. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 189, amending National Banking Act of
1927, ch. 191, § 7(c), 44 Stat. 1228 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(2) (1964)).
16. Speaking on the floor of the Senate, Senator Glass, the sponsor of the amendment, said
that branching would be allowable "in only those States the laws of which permit branch banking."
76 CONG. REC. 2511 (1933).
17. 12 U.S.C. § 30 (1964). This amendment was considered a desirable addition to the
National Banking Act "... [s]ince a change in location of a bank may be a matter of importance
to the community, and since the Comptroller must approve any change of location of a branch, he
should have the authority to approve changes of location of the main office within the city." H.R.
REP. No. 692, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1959).
18. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965); Community Nat'l
Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962); Camden Trust Co. v. Gidney, 301 F.2d 521 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962). See generally I K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 4.04 (Supp. 1965).
19. See, e.g., Bank of Dearborn v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 377 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1967);
Industrial State Bank & Trust Co. v. Camp, 284 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Hoosier State
Bank v. Saxon, 248 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Commercial State Bank v. Gidney, 174 F.
Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1959).
20. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
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section 36(c)(2), 21 only two have considered simultaneous relocation and
branching applications under sections 30 and 36(c)(2). The District
Court of the Western District of Michigan has twice upheld such
simultaneous applications,2 thereby permitting two nationals banks to
relocate their main offices and retain their former headquarters as
branches. In these cases, the court found that Congress had not intended
to limit the relocation of a national bank's principal office by
incorporating state statutory standards into section 30. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reached the opposite result when
faced with the same facts. In Marion National Bank v. Van Buren
Bank,23 the court overturned the Comptroller's approval, even though
each application considered separately was lawful, because it determined
that the net effect of the national bank's maneuver was the establishment
of a branch that would not have been authorized to a state bank under
state statutory law.
24
In the instant case, the court initially concluded that the
Comptroller's finding should be sustained if it were supported by
substantial evidence and were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. Noting that the Comptroller had conducted a thorough
investigation of the record, the court upheld his determination that the
proposed move was a bona fide relocation of the main office to which
section 30 and not section 36(c)(2) was applicable. The court reasoned
that since branching considerations under section 36(c)(2) and state
branching law were inapplicable, it was irrelevant that PPNB sought to
use simultaneous applications as a device to obtain in substance that
which was precluded to state banking associations by state law. The
court determined that the doctrine of competitive equality did not
compel a conjunctive reading of sections 30 and 36(c)(2) since neither the
legislative history nor the statutory language of either section indicated
that state law was intended to govern the relocation of national banks'
main offices.2 The court declined to utilize the statutory construction
21. See cases cited notes 18-19 supra.
22. Merchants & Miners Bank v. Saxon, Civil No. 66-1042 (W.D. Mich. July 13, 1966);
Traverse City State Bank v. Empire Nat'l Bank, 228 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
23. 418 F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1969).
24. Speaking for the court, Judge Fairchild said, "[W]e affirm the judgment solely upon the
basis that the maneuver proposed involves creation of a branch which would not be authorized to
state banks by the statute law of Indiana and is therefore not authorized for national banks by 12
U.S.C. § 36(c)." Id. at 135.
25. The court acknowledged that the opposite result had been reached by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Marion Nat'l Bank v. Van Buren Bank, 418 F.2d 121 (7th Cir.
1969), in which it was held that § 30 and § 36(c)(2) were to be considered conjunctively. The court,
however, observed that the basis for the Seventh Circuit's holding in Marion (see First Nat'l Bank
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device of in pari materia in its consideration of whether main office
relocation should be limited by state law on the ground that both
sections 30 and 36(c)(2) have an independent scope and purpose. The
court therefore upheld the Comptroller's ruling that PPNB could
simultaneously relocate its main office and retain the former office as a
branch.
The instant decision represents a step toward a national banking
system unfettered by state law restrictions regarding branching. Under
the rationale of the decision a national bank may now branch from a
decaying and static urban area into a growing suburban community
irrespective of state branching laws. Frequent utilization of this
relocation procedure by national banks will weaken the competitive
position of many state banking institutions whose branching operations
are restricted by state law. Presently, fourteen states have statutes that
prohibit branch banking in any form by state banking institutions, 2 and
24 states significantly restrict the areas available to a state bank seeking
to establish a branch. 27 Consequently, in order for state banking
associations in these states to remain competitive with the national
banks, their legislatures will be compelled to revise their banking
statutes to allow freer branching. The effect of the instant decision,
therefore, may be unlimited branching by both state and national banks
in all states. Although this result might be desirable from the standpoint
of the national economy,2 it is contrary to the express policy of 38
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 285 U.S. 252 (1966)) was inapposite in that it treated only § 36(c)(2)
and made no mention of § 30. 425 F.2d at 344.
26. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-340 (1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (1963); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 659.06 (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16/2, § 106 (Smith-Hurd 1970); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 524.1202 (1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111 (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.34
(1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.107 (1968); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 5-1028 (1968); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 8-1,105 (1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-14 (Supp. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 501
(1966); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903 (Supp. 1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31A-8-12
(Supp. 1970).
27. ALA. CODE tit. 5, § 125(1) (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 36-59 (Supp. 1969); GA.
CODE ANN. § 13-203.1 (Supp. 1969); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 403-53 (Supp. 1968); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 18-1707 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287.180 (Supp. 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:54
(1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9. § 442 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 172A, § 12 (1970); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 23.710(171) (Supp. 1970); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5228 (Supp. 1968); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 384-B:! to -B:6 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-19 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 48-2-17 to -19 (1966); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 105 (McKinney Supp. 1970); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1II1.01-.05 (Baldwin Supp. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 714.010-.990 (1969); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 902(b), 903(b), 904-07 (1967); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 51-20-1 to -12
(Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-211 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-3-6 to -6.3 (Supp.
1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-39 (1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.40.020 (Supp. 1969); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 221.04 (Supp. 1969).
28. See Hearings on the Conflict of Federal and State Banking Laws Before the House
Comnm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 275-79 (1963).
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states 29 and the federal government.30 Whether the instant decision
produces such h drastic change depends to a great extent on how widely
subsequent courts accept it as persuasive authority. It is submitted that
this case should not be considered as authority in future adjudications of
the same issue. While the opinion is logically consistent, it is
incompatible with the basic policy of competitive equality, which
pervades the National Banking Act.31 It is obvious from the language
and legislative history of section 36(c)(2)12 that it was the intent of
Congress to implement this policy by permitting national banks to
branch only in those states that permit branching and only to the extent
that those states accord branching privileges to state banking
associations. By construing sections 30 and 36(c)(2) of the National
Banking Act separately, the instant court has accomplished that which
Congress intended to disallow by the enactment of section 36(c)(2). The
court could have reached a more desirable result, and one that would
have been in harmony with the policy of the National Banking Act, by
voiding the Comptroller's certificate on the ground that the transaction
in question allowed, in substance, branching into an area denied to state
banks in violation of the doctrine of competitive equality.3 In order to
meet the banking needs of rapidly expanding population centers, it may
be desirable to rid the economy of the arbitrary restrictions imposed by
branch banking statutes, but the alteration of the express policy of the
National Banking Act is properly a matter of congressional
consideration and pronouncement, not a matter of statutory
construction. If the instant decision is widely accepted, Congress will be
forced either to tacitly accept the judicial modification of the policy of
the National Banking Act or to amend sections 30 and 36(c)(2) so that
state law specifically is incorporated as the standard in simultaneous
main office relocation and branching transactions. Since Congress has
traditionally supported the policy of the National Banking Act, it is
29. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 13, 15 supra.
31. For other statutory areas in which Congress has applied state banking laws to national
banks see 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1964) (allowable capitalization of a newly created national bank); id.
§ 85 (limitation on loan interest rates); id. § 92(a) (trust provisions cannot contravene state law).
id. § 214(c) (Supp. 1970) (conversions and mergers cannot contravene state law).
32. See notes 3, 11, 14, 16 supra and accompanying text.
33. Courts have often looked beyond the formal compliance with a statutory provision to
determine whether the substance of the proposed transaction is in accord with the legislative purpose
of the act in question. See Haggar Co. v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 389 (1940) (declared value excess
profits taxes); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (corporate reorganization). See generally




likely that Congress, if confronted with this problem, will choose the
latter course of action, thereby nullifying the effect of the instant case.
Taxation-Corporate Income Tax-Liquidating Corporation
Denied Nonrecognition Benefits of Section 337 Because Sales of
Depreciable Assets Were Integral Part of Its Business
Taxpayer, a California corporation, owned and operated a
professional baseball team.' Pursuant to a "working agreement"'2 with
Pittsburgh Athletic Co. and to the baseball draft,3 Pittsburgh and other
major league baseball teams could select for purchase certain of
taxpayer's player contracts. During the period from 1948 to 1957,
taxpayer sold a large number of player contracts at a substantial overall
profit4 and reported the gains as ordinary income. 5 Following the
adoption of a plan of complete liquidation, taxpayer sold eight player
contracts to Pittsburgh6 within the. twelve-month statutory liquidation
1. The team was a minor league team known as the Hollywood Stars, a member of the
Pacific Coast Baseball League.
2. The Pittsburgh Athletic Co. paid Hollywood $20,000 a year under this working agreement,
which gave Pittsburgh the right to select at any time, under certain conditions, the contracts of any
players belonging to Hollywood. It was customary for Pittsburgh to pay the fair market value for
all player contracts it bought. This arrangement was vital to Hollywood and other minor league
teams because they were unable to compete with major league teams in recruiting good young
players. If Hollywood had not agreed to the provisions of this working arrangement with
Pittsburgh, it would have been impossible to obtain enough players to field a baseball team, since all
the good players were owned by major league teams and would be assigned to minor league teams
like Hollywood only under these conditions.
3. The world of professional baseball is governed by a detailed set of agreements and rules,
codified in The Baseball Blue Book. These rules establish a procedure whereby players on minor
league teams can be selected by major league teams in a "player draft." Hollywood, as a member of
the Pacific Coast League, was thereby required to sell to a major league team each year on demand
at least one player contract previously assigned to it by a major league team and also the contracts
of any players with 5 or more years of service. This draft prevented minor league teams such as
Hollywood from holding players indefinitely.
4. Hollywood received $799,800 for 224 contracts sold during the entire period, $100,000 of
which was profit. During the same period, it made $280,000 in profits from other sources. In 1956-
57, it realized a profit of $150,000 on such sales, while losing $130,000 on all other activities.
5. In contrast, Hollywood deducted as an annual expense the entire cost of the player
contracts purchased each year. During the period 1947-58 it purchased 175 contracts for $561,450.
6. On October 1, 1957, Hollywood assigned the contracts of 2 players to Pittsburgh. The sale
called for installment payments, and Hollywood reported the initial payment of $50,000 as ordinary
income on its income tax return for the fiscal period ending October 31, 1957. The remaining
$90,000, which Hollywood received because the players were retained by Pittsburgh after April 1,
1958, was reported as nontaxable income, under § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, on its
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period and reported the gain as nontaxable income under section 337 of
the Internal Revenue Code. 7 The Commissioner contended and
subsequently ruled that the transaction involved property held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and was
therefore excluded from nonrecognition treatment under section 337.8
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner,9 and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.' 0 The Supreme Court, however,
reversed and remanded" for reconsideration in light of its recent decision
in Malat v. Riddell. 12 On remand, the Commissioner contended that the
sales of the contracts were excluded from nonrecognition treatment
under section 337 because they were an integral part of the business.13
The Tax Court again found for the Commissioner, holding that the
income tax return for the period ending October 31, 1958. In January 1958, Hollywood assigned 6
player contracts to the Columbus Baseball Club for $27,000. The court treated this sale as one to
Pittsburgh since Columbus was similarly affiliated with it. This gain was also reported as
nontaxable income under § 337.
7. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 337(a) provides in part: "If-
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 1954, and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of such plan, all of the
assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of
property within such 12-month period."
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 337(b)(1) provides in part: "For purposes of subsection (a), the
term 'property' does not include-
(A) stock in trade of the corporation, or other property of a kind which would properly be
included in the inventory of the corporation if on hand at the close of the taxable year, and property
held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or
business ....
9. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n, 42 T.C. 234 (1964). The facts are stated in detail in this
opinion. The Tax Court's reasoning was three-pronged. It found the contracts were held "primarily
for sale" because there was an "essential or substantial holding for sale," placing particular
emphasis on the frequency of the sales and the amount of profit derived from them. The court noted
that Hollywood had continually reported the receipts from these sales as ordinary income in the past
and concluded that this was consistent with the contracts being held for sale in the ordinary course
of business. Finally, the court relied on Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955),
in reasoning that profits arising from the everyday sale of property that is an integral part of the
business should not receive nonrecognition treatment under § 337. Lee, New Case Greatly
Broadens Exception to Nonrecognition Provisions of Section 337, 33 J. TAX. 20 (1970).
10. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1965).
11. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 824 (1966). The Supreme Court
remanded to the court of appeals, which in turn remanded to the Tax Court for new factual findings.
12. 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
13. The Commissioner argued that §§ 337, 1221, and 1231 of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code should be similarly construed. Under § 1221, the Supreme Court had ruled that sales that
were integral to a business were not entitled to capital asset treatment. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v.
Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). Thus the Commissioner reasoned that Corn Products should be
extended to § 337 and thus deny nonrecognition treatment to the taxpayer. See notes 15-23 infra
and accompanying text.
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contracts were stock in trade held by taxpayer principally for sale in the
ordinary course of business. The court based its decision on a finding
that the contracts were an integral part of petitioner's business. 4 On
appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held, affirmed. When sales
of depreciable assets are an integral part of a liquidating corporation's
business, even though the assets are not held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business, the sales are not entitled to
nonrecognition treatment under section 337 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Hollywood Baseball Association v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3142 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970).
Section 337(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code provides that
corporations adopting a plan of complete liquidation and thereafter
distributing all of their assets within twelve months will not recognize
gain or loss from a sale or exchange of their property within this period."
Since section 337(a) was aimed primarily at "winding-up" sales,
Congress deemed it necessary to prevent taxpayers from escaping
taxation of income derived from sales in the ordinary course of business
merely because the sales occurred during the liquidation period.' 6 In
order to effectuate this legislative purpose, section 337(b)(1)(A) was
enacted to exclude from special treatment "stock in trade" and property
held by the corporation "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of its trade or business." 17 Sections 1221 and 1231 of the Code
have exclusionary provisions similar to those of section 337.18 Section
14. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n, 49 T.C. 338 (1968).
15. See note 7 supra. Prior to 1954, there was a substantial tax advantage inherent in a sale of
distributed property by shareholders after liquidation of corporate assets as opposed to a sale of
assets by the corporation itself, followed by a liquidating distribution of the proceeds of the sale to
the shareholders. Since the property received by the shareholders in liquidation would receive a
stepped-up basis, the realization of capital gain upon subsequent sale would be substantially smaller
than if the corporation had sold the property with its low basis before liquidation. Any sale
negotiated by the corporation before liquidation that was made by the shareholders after liquidation
was imputed to the corporation. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). Section
337 has the effect of changing the result in cases like Court Holding Co., since a sale by the
shareholders imputed to the corporation would receive nonrecognition treatment as to any gain
realized. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS §§ 9.63, .64 (2d ed. 1966).
16. See H.R. REp. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A-107 (1954); cf. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1954).
17. See note 8 supra. Not all property held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of
business fails to qualify for nonrecognition under § 337(b)(1)(A). If a corporation sells
"substantially all of the property" attributable to its trade or business to one person in one sale,
then the property and any installment obligations acquired in respect of the sale qualify for
nonrecognition under § 337. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 337(b)(2). This is known as the bulk
sales exception.
18. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1221 provides in part: "[Tihe term 'capital asset' .. does
not include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included
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1221 defines a capital asset as property held by the taxpayer that does
not fall into certain excluded categories. 9 One of these exclusions is
property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business, further evidencing a congressional policy of treating profits
and losses arising from the everyday operation of a business as ordinary
income. Although the sale or exchange of a capital asset results in capital
gain or loss, the sale of property excluded from section 122 1's definition
of a capital asset receives ordinary income treatment. Section 123 1,
however, provides that gain from a sale or exchange of real or
depreciable personal property used in a trade or business for over six
months will receive capital gains treatment, thereby extending this
favorable treatment to a class of property-depreciable property used in
the trade or business2--explicitly excluded from the definition of capital
in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business .... "
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 123 1(b)(1) provides in part: "The term 'property used in the trade
or business' means property used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation. . . which is not-
(A) property of a kind which would properly be includible in the inventory of the taxpayer if
on hand at the close of the taxable year,
(B) property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business. .. "
One court has indicated that the exclusionary provisions of all 3 statutes should be similarly
construed. See Jeanese, Inc. v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
19. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1221; see note 18 supra.
20. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1231 was originally enacted as § 117(j) of the 1939 Code in
1942 in response to a problem of limited scope. Shipping companies whose vessels possessed a
wartime fair market value greatly exceeding their adjusted basis were realizing an involuntary profit
on the destruction of insured vessels by the enemy and on the requisition of vessels for military use,
as were industrial firms whose plants and equipment were being condemned by the United States for
use in the war program. Because it seemed unfair to tax these involuntary profits at the high
wartime rates, Congress provided "that the gain on an involuntary conversion of business property
should be taxed at the capital gains rate," while preserving for taxpayers whose property had
declined in value the right to report an ordinary loss. B. Bn'rKER, FEDERAL INCOmE, ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION 553 (3d ed. 1964). As enacted, however, the section applies to any sale or exchange
of business property, as well as to involuntary conversions. Congress evidently recognized that
many taxpayers were selling plant, machinery, and equipment either because of an implicit threat of
condemnation or due to other wartime conditions, and realized that it would be impossible to
distinguish between such sales and those that were wholly voluntary. Moreover, such sales of
business property to more efficient producers might stimulate the war production effort. Section
1231 thus "encouraged the taxpayer to depreciate business property as rapidly as possible, since
depreciation deductions reduce ordinary income," while an eventual sale of the property produced
profit that was taxable as long-term capital gain. Id. at 561. In 1962, Congress modified this result
by adding § 1245 to the 1954 Code, providing that "when the taxpayer disposes of certain
depreciable property, his gain (if any) must be reported as ordinary income to the extent of his post-
1961 depreciation deductions." Id. The "recapture" of depreciation applies only to depreciable
personal property and depreciable real property devoted to certain uses. Thus, although § 1245
reaches many transactions not falling into the § 1231 category, § 1231 was certainly the principal
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asset by section 1221. Consequently, Congress in effect has declared that
although property used in a trade or business is not a capital asset, it will
be treated as a capital asset.2 1 Section 1231 excludes from its treatment
property held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business2 and
thus remains consistent in this respect with both sections 337 and 1221.
Although Congress was specific in providing particular exclusions from
the general rules of sections 337, 1221, and 1231, the Supreme Court,
nevertheless, created a non-statutory exception to the definition of
capital asset in section 1221 in Corn Products Refining Co. v.
Commissioner.23 In that case, the Court held that the transactions of a
grain manufacturer who bought and sold corn futures to insure an
adequate supply of raw materials and to protect against price increases
were not entitled to the capital asset treatment of section 117 of the 1939
Code (section 1221 of the 1954 Code) because they were an "integral
part" of the business. This attempt to further limit the types of property
that would receive capital asset treatment under section 1221 was
mollified somewhat by the Court's subsequent decision in Malat v.
Riddell.u In that case, the Court dealt specifically with section 1221's
exclusion of property held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of
business and determined that "primarily" means "principally" or "of
first importance.' ' 7s Although the Court reaffirmed the Corn Products
doctrine in Malat, the Malat holding actually makes it more difficult for
property to be excluded under the Corn Products exception and in effect
increases the number of properties that can be designated as capital
assets. The government has attempted to extend the Corn Products
doctrine to sales of depreciable property but has enjoyed no success.25 In
reason for its enactment, and § 1231 transactions furnish the principal opportunity for its
application.
21. Deltide Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 661, 666 (E.D. La.
1968).
22. Ir. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1231; see note18 supra.
23. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
24. 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966). Malat involved a landowner who sold land that he claimed to
have purchased for rental purposes. The government contended that the intended use was dual:
either developing for rental purposes, or selling, whichever seemed more profitable. The district
court found that there was a dual purpose and ruled that the property was "primarily" held for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of business, because "primarily" meant "substantially." Id. at
571. The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that "primarily" means "of first importance" or
"principally," and remanded for further findings. Id. at 572.
25. Id. at 572. The Tax Court in the instant case, like the district court in the Malat case, held
initially that property is "primarily held for sale" if there is only an "essential or substantial
holding for sale." See 42 T.C. at 259.
26. Bernstein, "Primarily for Sale": A Semantic Snare, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1116 n. Ill
(1968).
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Deltide Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. United StatesY the only case to
confront this problem squarely, a district court decided that the Corn
Products doctrine does not apply to section 1231 depreciable assets. The
court reasoned that by enacting section 1231 Congress had created a
"fence of immunity" from this doctrine around property used in the
trade or business and had decided that this property should receive
capital asset treatment even though it does not technically qualify as a
capital asset.?' Deltide concluded that the Corn Products non-statutory
exception to the definition of capital asset should not be applied to
property that has been specifically labeled a capital asset by Congress. 2'
The instant court affirmed the Tax Court's decision but the
reasoning used by the two courts differed significantly. The court
specifically rejected the Tax Court's determination that the player
contracts were held "primarily" for sale, as the term is defined by
Malat.30 The court reasoned, however, that the instant case was
controlled by the Corn Products doctrine, because this doctrine was
cited with approval in Malat.31 Although Corn Products involved only
section 1221 assets, the court reasoned that this section's underlying
policy of not giving preferential treatment to profits and losses from
everyday business operations was equally applicable to section 1231
assets. Rejecting both the reasoning and holding of the Deltide decision,
the court concluded that the Corn Products doctrine applies to
depreciable assets under section 1231. Turning to legislative history, the
court found that the purpose of the exclusionary provisions of section
337 was unclear. Nevertheless, the similarity of that section's exclusions
with the correlative provisions of sections 1221 and 1231, coupled with
the fact that the Supreme Court had remanded the instant case for
reconsideration in light of Malat, prompted the court to hold that Corn
Products also applies to section 337 assets. In determining whether the
27. 279 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. La. 1968).
28. Id. at 666.
29. The court also thought it important that, although all capital asset provisions were dealt
with in § 117 of the 1939 Code, Congress split that section into several headings in the 1954 Code,
with § 1221 under the title "General Rules for Determining Capital Gains and Losses," and
§ 1231 under the heading "Special Rules for Determining Capital Gains and Losses." 279 F. Supp.
at 667.
30. As the instant court points out, the Tax Court tried to merge the "primarily" test of
Malat with the "integrally" test of Corn Products. 423 F.2d at 497.
31. "The record also makes it clear that [the Tax Court's] holding is not really based upon
Malat. . . but on the decision in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner. . . . In short, we
think it quite unrealistic to say that in fact, to use the lanauge of Malat, Hollywood's player
contracts were held by it 'principally' for sale to customers, or that sale to such customers was 'of
first importance' in its holding of the contracts." Id. at 495.
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transactions of the instant case fell within the Corn Products exception,
the court reviewed numerous prior cases 32 and concluded that the
"integral" test is satisfied when the activities are carried on to protect or
insure the functioning of the taxpayer's business. Since the sales of
baseball player contracts were essential to the functioning of the instant
taxpayer's business, the court held that they were excluded from
nonrecognition treatment under section 337.
Although the instant court undoubtedly reached the correct
conclusion, a close examination of the reasoning used by the court
reveals serious problems that may present a dangerous precedent. The
court could have avoided this danger by resting its decision squarely on
Malat, as the Supreme Court suggested by remanding the case. The
court, however, took an unrealistic view of the taxpayer's business in
holding that its primary reason for existence was "to make money by
playing professional baseball and selling tickets to the games."' ' The
number and frequency of sales of player contracts, together with their
role as the taxpayer's only valuable source of profit in recent years,
clearly would have justified a holding that the contracts were held
"principally" for sale in the ordinary course of business. 34 Instead, the
court chose to apply the Corn Products doctrine and thereby created a
judicial exception to section 1231 property, just as the Supreme Court
had done to section 1221 assets in Corn Products.3 Application of the
Corn Products reasoning to section 1231 assets is subject to criticism
since it closes one more door to tax relief for the taxpayer and flies in the
face of both the legislative history and the supporting language of the
statute. As the Deltide court concluded, Congress specifically provided
that property used in the trade or business would be given capital asset
treatment under section 1231 unless it fell into one of the enumerated
categories. Because Congress singled out property that is not defined as
a capital asset under section 1221 to receive capital asset treatment and
did not include the Corn Products exception in section 123 I's exclusions,
it is clear that Congress did not intend that the Corn Products doctrine
be extended. This proposition was strengthened by the subsequent
enactment of section 1245, which was an attempt to reduce somewhat
32. These cases involved the sale of equipment no longer usable in the business, whereas the
player contracts were never sold because the players were no longer fit to play baseball. See id. at
502-03.
33. Id. at 495.
34. See note 4 supra.
35. One writer called it "judicial indifference to statutory language." Bernstein, supra note
26, at 1116.
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the enormous tax savings that resulted from taxpayers, depreciating
section 1231 property, using this depreciation as a deduction against
their ordinary income, and then incurring only a capital gains tax on the
subsequent sale of that property.3 6 Section 1245 "recaptures" the
depreciation by requiring the taxpayer, after the sale of the depreciable
property,37 to report the gain as ordinary income to the extent of his
post-1961 depreciation deductions. If Congress had intended that Corn
Products apply to section 1231, it would not have specifically enacted
section 1245 to reduce these tax savings when Corn Products would
require taxation at ordinary rates anyway.38 Another reason militating
against the instant decision is the difference that would have resulted if
the sale of the contracts had been a bulk sale. Section 337(b)(2) would
have assured it nonrecognition treatment, suggesting that Congress did
not intend that all property which is an integral part of the business, such
as inventory, should be excepted from the benefits of section 337. 31 A
liberal reading of this decision might even mean that ordinary business
assets such as machinery and real estate would be excluded from tax
relief under section 337 because the assets sold were considered to be an
integral part of the business. 40 Thus, the instant decision makes section
337, as well as sections 1231 and 1245, virtually inapplicable to such
sales.
It is submitted, however, that a narrow reading of this decision is
both possible and desirable. The court's holding was based on the
finding that the contract sales were an integral part of the business, not
the contracts themselves. Thus, the profits from the sales failed to
qualify for nonrecognition under section 337 because the sales, not the
36. "The President stated that our capital gains concept should not encompass this kind of
income. He indicated that this inequity should be eliminated. . . . He states that we should not
encourage the further acquisition of such property through tax incentives as long as the loophole
remains. This problem also is of major significance in connection with the recent depreciation
liberalization announced by the Treasury Department. . . . [A]dditional ordinary income would be
converted into capital gain if this were not dealt with in this provision." 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3297, 3398 (1962).
37. The depreciable property to which § 1245 applies is specifically stated in the Code
section. It reaches some transactions not falling into the § 1231 category and most of those which
do fall in the § 1231 category. It should be noted, however, that § 1245 does not completely
eliminate the possibility of reporting a profit on the sale of depreciable property as long-term capital
gain under § 1231. Buildings and their structural components, for example, are not subject to
§ 1245. See B. BiTrKER, supra note 20, at 562.
38. Although the decision renders § 1245 almost totally useless, there will still be certain
instances that do not fall within the Corn Products exclusion and the property will still be treated
under §§ 1231 and 1245.
39. Lee, supra note 9, at 23.
40. Id. at 22.
[Vol. 24
RECENT CASES
contracts, were deemed by the court to be an integral part of the
business. It is arguable, of course, that since the problem only arises
when there is a sale of the property, this distinction is without substance.
It is significant, however, that the instant court never stated that the
contracts themselves were an integral part of the business. The
significance is readily apparent if one recalls that the Supreme Court's
holding in Corn Products was that the transactions in corn futures, not
the corn futures themselves, constituted an integral part of the business.
The Deltide court examined this distinction and concluded that the mere
fact that business property is an integral part of the total business
process does not mean that gains from the disposition of such property
must be treated as ordinary income "where the disposition of the
property is not necessary to the essence of the revenue-producing
process."'" The broad extension of the instant case to all property
integral to a business, therefore, may not be valid.42 Only "sales" that
are deemed integral to a business will be denied nonrecognition. Since
the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the instant case, this
suggested narrow reading would limit the scope of the case's application
and would be more in keeping with the legislative history of sections
1221, 123 1, and 337. Thus during a period of liquidation under section
337, a sale of ordinary business assets, which are an integral part of the
business, will not be taxed as ordinary income if it is proved that the
"sale" of these assets is not integral to the business. It is hoped that the
narrow interpretation suggested will provide future courts with an
effective standard in applying the instant holding to section 337
transactions.
Torts-Aviation-Air Traffic Controller Has Duty to Warn Pilot
of Adverse Weather Conditions That Cause Visibility to Fall
Below FAA Minimums
Plaintiffs, victims of a charter airline crash,' sought damages in
41. 279 F. Supp. at 668.
42. The wood used to make paper in a paper mill, for example, is an integral part of the
business, but the sale of that wood is not an integral part of the business. There are certainly
instances, however, when the mill might sell excess wood to get rid of a surplus. If the instant case is
interpreted narrowly, the sales of the wood would get nonrecognition treatment under § 337.
1. The C-46 plane had been chartered by a college to transport the school football team from
Santa Maria, California, to Toledo, Ohio, and return. The plane crashed on takeoff for the return
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federal district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)2 for the
negligence of a.government air traffic controller in failing to warn the
pilot of the airline not to take off at a time when visibility was below
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) minimums.3 Plaintiffs alleged
that the controller was under a duty to warn the pilot not to take off
because of the extreme weather conditions that existed. The United
States contended that under the applicable regulations,4 the pilot had the
sole responsibility for judging whether weather conditions were suitable
for flight. 5 The trial court ruled that the controller was under a duty to
warn the pilot of the adverse weather conditions.6 On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed.
When a flight is clearly prohibited by FAA regulations because of
adverse weather conditions, an air traffic controller has a duty to warn
the pilot not to take off. Stork v. United States, 430 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir.
1970).
Historically, the pilot has been considered primarily responsible for
the safety of his aircraft.7 The FAA regulations have reflected this view,
trip on October 29, 1960. The delay in resolution of the cases against the United States was caused
principally by a declaratory relief action brought by the insurer of the aircraft owner seeking a
ruling that its insurance contract was void due to breaches of warranty by the owner. Thirty-five
cases were joined for this action, which tried the issue of liability of the United States. Stork v.
United Stares, 278 F. Supp. 869, 872 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
3. The regulation in effect at the time of the crash provided: "No flight shall be started unless
the take off, enroute operation, and landing at destination can be conducted in accordance with the
requirements of Part 60 of this subchapter, but in no case less than the minimums specified below."
14 C.F.R. § 42.55 (1961). Part (b) of the regulation refers to 42 C.F.R. §§ 609-10 (1961) for the
rules governing instrument flight and also states that the visibility minimums for each airport can be
found in the Approach and Landing Charts and Radio Facility Charts of the Coast and Geodetic
Survey and the Airman's Guide. According to testimony by a weather bureau official, visibility at
the Toledo airport when the crash occurred was zero miles in fog. This condition is declared "when
the distance at which an object can be seen is less than 125 feet." 278 F. Supp. at 874.
4. See note 3 supra.
5. The United States also contended that under the existing regulations the controller had
neither the duty nor the authority to deny take-off clearance. The trial court rejected this contention.
FAA regulations had rendered the question moot by the time of the instant court's decision. See
note 25 infra. The government further contended that the proximate cause of the crash was the
negligence of the pilot in attempting to take off in violation of the minimum visibility standard set
by the aircraft owner, and in not properly burning out his engines before take-off, thereby
preventing the engine spark plugs from igniting and contributing to the stall that caused the aircraft
to crash. The plane also was overloaded by 1,400 pounds.
6. The court also found that the proximate cause of the crash was a stalling of the aircraft
brought on by the premature lift-off, which was caused by the loss of lateral bearings by the pilot
due to his inability to see the runway lights.
7. For a discussion of the background of air traffic controller liability see Comment, Air
Traffic Control: Hidden Danger in the Clear Blue Skies, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 255 (1968).
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providing that the pilot has responsibility for determining the suitability
of weather conditions for flying, while the controller's responsibility has
been limited to directing air traffic.8 The statutory structure for
expanding the traffic controller's responsibility originated with the
passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, which permits actions
against the United States for negligent acts of government employees.9
After its enactment, there was some doubt over whether an air traffic
controller performed a function for which the United States could be
held liable under the statute. In Eastern Airlines, Inc., v. Union Trust
Co.," * the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, rejecting the
assertion that air traffic controllers perform discretionary functions,
found that controllers instead perform operational functions under the
FTCA.1' As a result, the government has never been successful in
claiming immunity from suit for controller negligence under the
FTCA.12 Utilizing this statutory framework to adjudge the scope of the
8. The applicable regulations and FAA circulars are set out in the district court opinion. 278
F. Supp. at 875-79 nn.4-9.
9. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 410, 60 Stat. 843 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1964)). The statute provides in relevant part: IT]he district courts . . . shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages
. . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment .. "
10. 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907
(1955).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964) provides:
"[S]ection 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government. . in the
execution of a statute or regulation . or based upon the exercise or performance [of] . . . a
discretionary function or duty .... "
12. The government has attempted to assert defenses based upon the exception for an act of a
government employee in the execution of a regulation (see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964)) and on the
exception for any claim arising out of misrepresentation (see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1964)). For text
of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964) see note II supra. The execution of a regulation defense was raised
in Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967). The
court found that the controller had violated § 265.2 of the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual
of the FAA by not reporting a change in visibility to a pilot approaching for a landing, because the
information was necessary for the pilot to make his landing. Since the regulation was violated, the
government could not escape liability by arguing that the controller had executed the regulation,
since in fact he had not. One commentator points out that the manual in question is not a regulation
and that the government's case also should fail on that basis. Levy, The Expanding Responsibility
of the Government Air Traffic Controller, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 401, 408-09 (1968). The
misrepresentation defense was raised in Ingham, supra, and United Airlines, Inc., v. Wiener, 335
F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). In United Airlines, a case
involving a crash resulting from the failure to notify a commercial airliner of military aircraft flying
in the area, the Ninth Circuit held that where the gravamen of the complaint is negligence, the
misrepresentation exception does not apply. 335 F.2d at 398. See United States v. Neustadt, 366
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controller's duty, the courts in recent years have tended to impose a
concurrent responsibility for aircraft safety on controllers because of the
congressional mandate authorizing the Federal Aviation Administrator
to formulate rules and regulations to promote air safety.' 3 Cases of
alleged controller negligence have involved three factual categories. 4 The
first category involves the question of governmental liability for mid-air
collisions and near misses. The United States has been held liable under
the FTCA when an air traffic controller has authorized two planes to
land on the same runway, 15 when two controllers, acting independently,
have ordered different planes to use the same route, 6 when a controller
has failed to take further action after warning one plane of the possibility
of collision, 17 and when a controller has failed to issue a warning
immediately after a dangerous situation has developed.' On the other
hand, the government has been absolved from responsibility in cases
where there was contributory negligence on the part of the pilot. 19 The
second category of cases on the issue of controller negligence involves
responsibility for instances of wake turbulence. The government has
been successful in resisting the imposition of liability in two cases
dealing with this question largely because the pilots in both cases were
guilty of contributory negligence. 20 The two most recent decisions
U.S. 696, 711 n.26 (1961) (holding that complaint is within the misrepresentation exception but
noting that misrepresentation is identified with invasion of commercial interests). See also Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (after undertaking a duty, government is under
obligation to use due care in performance of the duty).
13. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348(a)-(c) (1964).
14. Levy, supra note 12, at 411.
15. Eastern Air Lines, nc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See notes 10-12
supra and accompanying text.
16. Cattaro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Va. 1964) (plaintiff was
injured because of evasive action taken by commercial airliner to avoid collision).
17. Hochrein v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (private aircraft collided
after one plane failed to acknowledge signal from controller).
18. Maryland ex rel. Meyer v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1966) (controller
failed to warn commercial airliner of presence of military plane). See also 2 J. KENNELLY,
LrIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES ch. 8, at 1-12 (1968).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962) (controller's negligence
does not relieve pilot of primary duty for his aircraft); United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322
(5th Cir. 1960) (clearance to land does not relieve pilot of responsibility toward his and other
aircraft); Stanley v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (pilot's responsibility for his
own safety was paramount where visual flight conditions prevailed and where controller had no
reason to know and did not know plane was in the area).
20. Franklin v. United States, 342 F.2d 581 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 844 (1965)
(evidence showed that pilot's stalling of the plane caused the crash); Johnson v. United States, 183
F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Mich. 1960), affd, 295 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1961) (pilot was negligent in flying too
low on landing approach).
RECENT CASES
concerning wake turbulence have ruled, however, that a warning of the
presence of turbulence does not discharge the controller's duty. 2' In
Furumizo v. United States,z2 the Ninth Circuit found generally that the
Federal Aviation Act places a duty for aircraft safety on the FAA and
requires the controller to broaden his concern beyond traffic regulation
to overall aircraft safety23 The third category of cases where liability for
controller negligence has been alleged involves weather conditions. The
government has contended in these cases that controller responsibility is
limited to air traffic and that judgment concerning weather conditions is
for the pilot. The courts, however, have held that controllers have a duty
to provide accurate weather information to pilots24 because of the heavy
reliance by commercial carriers on the controllers. Similarly, most
courts have ruled that the controller must exercise due care in providing
this information. 25 At least one court has indicated that once the
controller has supplied accurate weather information, his duty is
discharged and the pilot must determine whether weather conditions are
suitable for landing. 6 The development of the law in all three categories
reveals that courts have recognized that controllers have considerable
responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft. Moreover, courts
have refused to find that the controller has carried out his duty by merely
following FAA regulations to the letter.Y
In the instant case, the court initially found that visibility for the
takeoff was below FAA minimums for non-scheduled air carriers.
Observing that FAA regulations and procedures divide responsibilities
for air safety between the pilot and the air traffic controller,2 the court
found that the normal division of responsibilities was not applicable
since the flight was prohibited by FAA regulations. Rejecting the
21. Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'g 249 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga.
1965) (warning of presence of "prop wash" was not sufficient to apprise pilot of light plane of
danger); Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965), affd, 381 F.2d 965 (9th
Cir. 1967) (controller failed to exercise proper judgment to maintain adequate separation at take off
between Piper and C-47). The courts have not articulated precisely what the controller must do to
discharge his duty.
22. 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967).
23. Id. at 968.
24. See, e.g., Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2nd Cir. 1967).
25. Id.
26. Smerdon v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1955) (pilot mistakenly
understood report of weather conditions at alternate airport to be report of conditions at intended
destination and proceeded toward fog-bound airport on basis of misunderstanding).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1962).
28. See note 8 supra.
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government's contention that the controller did not have a duty to warn,
even in the circumstances of the instant case, the majority found that the
regulations require the exercise of judgment by the controller in the
interests of the safety of the aircraft. The court, therefore, concluded that
the authorized clearance operated as an official invitation to the pilot to
proceed and that the controller's silence in the face of both adverse
weather conditions and the regulation prohibiting flights under these
conditions constituted a breach of duty.29 The dissent argued that the
controller did not have authority to deny clearance because of weather
conditions and should not be required to give "gratuitous advice" to the
pilot.3
°
The instant decision follows the judicial trend of expanding the
scope of the controller's duty. This expansion is sound because of the
increasing reliance that commercial air carriers have placed on
controllers and the resulting need for higher standards for air traffic
control. 31 Unfortunately, the court fails to take the opportunity to define
precisely the scope of the controller's duty. The court's decision is
conditioned on the violation of a regulation, which leaves unanswered
the question of controller duty when regulations are not being violated.
Since the court finds that some division of responsibility between pilot
and controller is contemplated, the implication must be that
responsibility will normally be divided unless weather conditions make
such a division inapplicable. The controller, however, may still be under
a duty to exercise judgment concerning weather conditions even though
the division of responsibility applies. The placing of an additional
judgment burden on the controller, coupled with his tense working
conditions, may be undesirable in terms of air safety. 32 Admittedly, a
29. Facts produced at the trial could have supported another basis for controller liability. The
transcript of the control tower's communication to the aircraft showed that the controller had
misinformed the pilot on the distance between runway lights. Plaintiff contended the pilot was
probably misled concerning the visibility conditions, causing the pilot to misjudge the visibility and
the length of the take-off roll. The district court, however, ruled that these factors did not constitute
a proximate cause of the crash. 278 F. Supp. at 873-75. The court did not deal specifically with the
district court's holding that the pilot is under a duty to deny take off clearance when adverse weather
conditions are present. This question was rendered moot by subsequent FAA regulations clearly
providing that the controller has authority to deny take-off clearance when departure runway
visibility is less than one-quarter mile or runway visual range is less than 2,000 feet. 278 F. Supp. at
878.
30. 430 F.2d at 1109.
31. See Comment, supra note 7.
32. The problem of increasing air traffic controller workloads is demonstrated in statistics
released by the FAA. In 1960, Air Traffic Control handled 9,765,521 aircraft operating under
Instrument Flight Rules. By 1970, the number rose by more than 100%, to 21,606,369. FAA, AIR
TRAFFIC ACTIVITY 3 (1970). Continued growth will result in an estimated 45.3 million aircraft
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controller should be required to use judgment while directing air traffic
and should not be allowed to fulfill his duty by a slavish following of
regulations. In addition, when weather conditions are clearly below
FAA minimums for flight, such as in the instant case, the controller
should be required to prevent pilots from taking off. On the other hand,
unless weather conditions are clearly unsafe for flight, the controller
should not be subject to the burden of exercising judgment, particularly
when the pilot possesses the necessary information to make the decision
and is not dependent on the controller to give him this information. It is
submitted that the controller should not be under a duty to warn when
conditions make it possible for responsibilities to be divided between the
controller and the pilot. It is one thing to fail to warn an aircraft or to
give incorrect information while it is in the air and dependent on the
controller. It is another to require the controllers to warn while the plane
is on the ground and the pilot has access to all relevant weather
information. While it is understandable that courts seek to find means to
provide relief to the victims of airline crashes and their successors, the
judiciary should not impose duties that override the policy of providing
effective means to safely control large numbers of private and
commercial aircraft. It is suggested that an imposition of liability
because of extraordinary circumstances is consistent with this broad
policy objective, but a finding of governmental liability in situations
where the pilot is fully informed and capable of reaching an independent
decision, and where extraordinary weather conditions are not present,
will not help produce greater safety for aircraft.
Torts-Landlord-Tenant -Landlord Owes Duty to Provide
Protection for Tenants Against Criminal Acts by Third Parties
Plaintiff, a tenant in an urban apartment house, brought a
negligence action against his corporate landlord seeking damages for an
handled by fiscal year 1980. FAA, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF AVIATION 5 (1969). Air Traffic
Control, however, has not substantially increased its manpower. This is partially demonstrated by a
more than 40% increase in productivity of controllers. To some extent this increase in productivity
has been made possible by improved technology, but the greater increase has been achieved through
extensive use of overtime. In 1969, the FAA requested appropriation for an increase of 2,800
controllers but even with the increase, controller productivity would be 39% greater than in 1964.
Hearings on the 1970 FAA Budget Request Before the Subcomm. on Dep't of Transp. & Related
Agencies Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
150 (1969). The total controller force at the time of the hearings was 21,127. Id. at 30. The FAA
estimates a need for 27,976 controllers in 1971 and 46,400 in 1980. FAA, THE NATIONAL AVIATION
SYSTEM PLAN: TEN YEAR PLAN 1971-1980, at 127 (1970). For a critical view of air traffic control
from a pilot's point of view see V. LOWELL, AIRLINE SAFETY IS A MYTH 69-75 (2d ed. 1968).
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assault and robbery committed by an unknown intruder in the common
hallway of the apartment building. Plaintiff contended that because
defendant knew that similar criminal acts had been occurring in the
building with increased regularity,' the failure to provide guards at the
building entrances constituted an actionable breach of its duty to afford
protection for its tenants.2 Defendant denied that it had a duty to protect
its tenants from foreseeable criminal acts even though perpetrated in
areas under its exclusive control.3 The trial court held as a matter of law
that the defendant had no duty to take affirmative action to protect its
tenants from the criminal acts of third persons. On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held, reversed and
remanded.4 The landlord of an urban apartment building has a duty to
provide security measures within his reasonable capacity for the
protection of tenants from foreseeable criminal acts by intruders on the
premises. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., No.
23,401 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970).
A landlord has an affirmative duty to protect tenants from physical
defects in his apartment building.5 Traditionally, however, private
landlords have not been subject to a duty to provide tenants with
protection against criminal assaults on the premises by third persons.'
This traditional rule has been based on two well-settled legal principles.
First, an individual is not legally obligated to take affirmative action to
protect another from the criminal acts of a third person.7 Secondly, a
landlord's duty to maintain premises within his control in a safe
condition is limited to correcting known physical defects.8 The
1. Police reports show that 20 crimes occurred in defendant's apartment building in 1966.
Furthermore, defendant had knowledge that criminal acts had been perpetrated in its apartment
building.
2. When plaintiff moved into the building, an employee of the defendant was on duty in the
lobby and a doorman was stationed at the front entrance at all times. Additionally, the 2 side
entrances were either watched or locked by 9:00 P.M. At the time of the assault, however, none of
the entrances was locked or guarded.
3. At the trial, defendant stipulated that it had been put on notice of a series of assaults,
robberies, and other criminal offenses being perpetrated upon its tenants. On appeal, defendant
admitted that the criminal acts were foreseeable.
4. The case was remanded for a determination of damages only.
5. Cioffi v. Queenstown Apts., Sec. E, Inc., 243 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Anderson v.
Marston, 161 Me. 378, 213 A.2d 48 (1965); 2 F. HARPER & F. JANES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.17
(1956). This duty is limited to correcting or making known the latent defects.
6. See, e.g., Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Goldberg v. Housing
Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 5, § 18.6.
7. Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 54 (3d ed. 1964); see
Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217 (1908).
8. Cohen Bros. v. Krumbein, 28 Ga. App. 788, 113 S.E. 58 (1922); Lemm v. Gould, 425
S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1968); Meade v. Montrose, 173 Mo. App. 722, 160 S.W. 11 (1913).
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development and crystallization of the first principle-nonliability for
the mere failure to act-is largely attributable to judicial recognition
that it is often impossible to anticipate the acts of another and to
determine exactly to whom the defendant owes a duty.' Most courts,
however, have recognized that this dilemma is greatly diminished when
certain "special relationships" of control exist, such as employer-
employee,10 common carrier-passenger," or innkeeper-guest, 2 since it is
then more readily apparent to whom the duty is owed. Consequently, a
duty to take affirmative action to provide protection from foreseeable
.criminal acts of third persons has been imposed in such relationships. 13
This rationale has been expanded to apply to new social relationships
that have arisen as society has become increasingly urban. New York
courts, for example, have held public housing authorities liable for
failure to take affirmative action to prevent dangerous situations from
arising in areas that they maintain." In situations in which there are no
judicially recognized "special relationships," the determination of when
and to whom a duty arises remains difficult. Although guidelines have
been proposed to facilitate this determination, 5 most courts have
rejected these proposals as unrealistic and have instead advocated a case-
by-case approach encompassing the overall social relationship.', The
9. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). See also Harper & Kime,
The Duty To Control the Conduct ofAnother, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
10. Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947); David v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 328 Mo. 437,41
S.W.2d 179 (1931), revdon other grounds, 284 U.S. 460 (1932).
I1. Hillman v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 126 Ga. 814,56 S.E. 68 (1906); Nute v. Boston
&Me. R.R., 214 Mass. 184, 100 N.E. 1099 (1913); Kinsey v. Hudson & M.R.R., 130 N.J.L. 285,32
A.2d 497 (Sup. Ct. 1943), affd, 131 N.J.L. 161, 35 A.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
12. Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, 5 Ill. App. 2d 327, 125 N.E.2d 544 (1955); McFadden v.
Bancroft Hotel Corp., 313 Mass. 56,46 N.E.2d 573 (1943).
13. Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947) (employer); Quigley v. Wilson Line, 38 Mass.
125, 154 N.E.2d 77 (1958) (common carrier); Miller v. Derusa, 77 So. 2d 748 (La. 1955)
(innkeeper). See generally Bohlen, 50 Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1937).
14. Geigel v. Housing Auth., 225 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (situation developed by
allowing recreation in prohibited area); Da Rocha v. Housing Auth., 109 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct.
1951), affd, 282 App. Div. 728, 122 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1953) (situation created by providing recreation
area in dangerous location). Liability, however, has not been imposed on private landlords.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 302 B, comment e at 90
(1965). The guidelines include situations in which a duty should be imposed: Where the actor's own
affirmative act has exposed the other to harm; where the actor has undertaken a duty, by contract or
otherwise, to protect the other; and where the actor entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to one
whom he knows is likely to inflict harm with it. While these examples are valuable as suggestions, a
strict adherence to them would not aid the courts in determining whether the overall relationship
requires a duty.
16. Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Mayer v. Housing Auth., 84
N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1964), affd, 44 N.J. 567, 210 A.2d 617 (1965); Goldberg
v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); see Note, Duty as a Limiting Factor in Tort
Liability: Landlord-Tenant, Contractors, Manufacturers, Licensees, 19 OKLA. L. REV. 320 (1966).
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second principle underlying the traditional limitations on the landlord's
duty-nonliability except for failure to correct known physical
defects' 7-also is premised on the concept of control since a landlord
possesses the exclusive ability to correct defects in such common areas as
hallways and stairwells.l 8 Many courts, however, have expanded the
landlord's duty to include the elimination of any dangerous situation."
Furthermore, two recent decisions, in dicta, have acknowledged a
landlord's liability for third-party criminal acts.20 Although these
developments have significantly eroded the traditional limitations on
landlord liability for third party acts, several courts have refused to
follow these decisions because of compelling practical considerations.
Among these considerations are the difficulty in determining
foreseeability of third-party criminal acts and the uncertainties in
constructing a causative chain,2 the vagueness of the duty imposed,2
and the potential economic consequences of the imposition of this duty.?
Although some courts have differed concerning the question of when an
affirmative duty should be imposed, there has been general agreement
that a standard of reasonable care is required when a duty arises. 24
In the instant case, the court initially defined the risk to be guarded
against as criminal assaults by intruders on the premises. The court then
found that the traditional limitations on the landlord's liability were
inapplicable when considered in the modern urban context in which the
landlord exercises control over his apartment house. Comparing the
17. See note 8 supra and accompanying test.
18. Chalfen v. Kraft, 324 Mass. 1, 84 N.E.2d 454 (1949); Grasselli Dyestuff Corp. v. John
Campbell & Co., 259 Mass. 103, 156 N.E. 17 (1927); see W. PROSsER, TORTS § 63 (3d ed. 1964).
19. E.g., Da Rocha v. Housing Auth., 109 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1951), affd, 282 App.
Div. 728, 122 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1953) (duty to keep premises reasonably safe meant prohibition of
recreation in unauthorized area); Siegel v. 1536-46 St. John's Place Corp., 184 Misc. 1053, 57
N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945) (duty to keep premises reasonably safe meant exclusion of
vicious animals).
20. Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252
A.2d 509 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969), noted in 48 N.C.L. REV. 713 (1970).
21. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962) (no duty imposed because
of the uncertainties as to whether measures by the landlord would have deterred the criminal acts of
a third party).
22. E.g., Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); Mayer v. Housing
Auth., 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1964), affd, 44 N.J. 567,210 A.2d 617 (1965)
(liability imposed after consideration of duty), noted in 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 140 (1965).
23. Genovay v. Fox, 50 N.J. Super. 538, 143 A.2d 229 (App. Div. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 29 N.J. 436, 149 A.2d 212 (1959) (economic and other practical factors considered).
Tenants would ultimately bear the expense of any measures made necessary by the imposition of a
duty on the landlard.
24. Tair v. Rock Inv. Co., 139 Ohio St. 629,41 N.E.2d 867 (1942); see W. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 63 (3d ed. 1964).
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facts of the instant case to the innkeeper-guest relationship in which
liability has traditionally been imposed, the court reasoned that a duty
clearly arose because the defendant-landlord was the only person in a
position to provide effective security for the common areas of the
apartment building and because the risk was entirely foreseeable by the
defendant.2 After finding that a duty was present, the court determined
that the scope of the duty was to be measured by the standard of
reasonable care under all the circumstances. 26 Applying this standard,
the court concluded that since the defendant had failed to provide
-security within its reasonable capacity against a foreseeable criminal
assault, it had clearly breached its duty and was thus liable27 for the
tenant's consequent injuries. The dissent, although recognizing that a
duty might be present, contended that the evidence as presented in the
record was insufficient to impose liability.2s
The instant case represents a continuation of the trend toward
expansion of a landlord's duty to protect his tenants from foreseeable
risks. This decision is particularly significant because for the first time a
private landlord has been held liable for the criminal acts of a third party
and the requisite duty and standard of care have been precisely
delineated. The ramifications of this unequivocal holding will be felt
immediately by both landlords and tenants. With the knowledge that
failure to maintain reasonable security against criminal acts on their
premises may result in financial liability, many landlords will likely take
the necessary steps to provide adequate security systems. The cost of
providing new security measures, although initially borne by landlords,
will inevitably be passed on to the tenants in the form of higher rent. This
additional expense, however, is not in itself objectionable because
tenants presently pay for losses attributable to criminal attacks either
directly or through increased insurance premiums. 29 Furthermore, it is
likely that the rent increase will be minimal since the expense will be
distributed among all tenants.30 Although the landlord's duty to provide
25. See note 3 supra.
26. The court reasoned that the practices normally used in apartment houses of similar size
and class would provide a test for determining reasonable care. In the instant case, the court decided
that the security previously provided by the defendant would have been sufficient. No. 23, 401, at
17.
27. The court also stated that the defendant was liable because the rental contract contained
an implied warranty of habitability under which the defendant was obligated to provide security
within his reasonable capacity. Id. at 14.
28. Id. at 21.
29. See 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 140, 149 & n.60 (1965).
30. If a building with 500 individual apartments hired 2 full-time guards at $7,000 per
annum, the cost per month to each tenant would be a little over $2.
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reasonable security measures is based upon the doctrine of exclusive
control, liability for foreseeable criminal assaults by intruders should
not be limited to attacks occurring solely in the common areas of the
premises. The ultimate purpose of imposing this duty on the landlord is
to prevent foreseeable attacks by third parties, and the duty should
remain constant whether the tenant is assaulted in the hallway or in his
individual apartment. Therefore, liability should be imposed for an
attack anywhere within the building if it can be shown that the attack
was a result of the landlord's breach of duty.
Although this decision in effect merely adds the landlord-tenant
relationship to the growing number of social relationships in which an
affirmative duty to act is imposed, it may have a broader significance
because of the approach used by the court in reaching its conclusion.
Instead of placing the instant fact situation into a predetermined
classification with its standard principles governing liability, the court
analyzed the complete situation and the total relationship thereby
created.31 This approach could serve as precedent for extending liability
to parties heretofore immune because they were outside the traditional
classes. Consequently, the importance of such common law labels as
licensees and invitees would be eliminated since the courts would be free
to examine the overall relationship between the parties to ascertain
whether a duty should be imposed. 32 Irrespective of the future effect, the
instant decision is commendable because the landlord's duty toward his
tenants for too long has not been commensurate with the responsibilities
demanded by the modern social relationship of which he is a part.
31. The instant court changed the focus of its attention in an effort to determine if a duty
should be imposed. It concentrated on determining whether a duty was created by the specific facts
of the case rather than deciding into which category the case would fit and then merely applying the
rigid law applicable to that category.
32. Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d 141, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892 (Dist. Ct. 1962)
(relationship between child and camp director sufficient to impose duty on director to protect child
from sexual molestation); McLeod v. Grant County School Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255
P.2d 360 (1953) (duty to prevent rape based on relationship between school and student).
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